The Redevelopmental State: Governing Surplus Life and Land in the ‘Urban Age’

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ABSTRACT

This article theorizes changing configurations of development governance emerging as states attempt to reconcile two contradictory pressures of global urbanization: dispossessing capitalist accumulation and demands for inclusive welfare. It introduces the ‘redevelopmental state’ as a dynamic spatio-political framework for understanding how hegemonic rule is tenuously forged amid potentially volatile urban land struggles. Whereas Northern urban redevelopment theories are less attentive to post-colonial urbanization processes and most developmental state scholarship has not focused on cities, the redevelopmental state offers an alternative conceptualization. It centres on how emerging regimes of territorial rule, development and political participation contour access to land and social benefits in Southern cities. Forged at key conjunctures of social pressure, these redevelopmental state spaces work through and beyond formal policies and institutions, and articulate with nationalist cultural politics of belonging and aspiration that foster consent for redevelopment while also legitimating exclusions, violence and dispossession. A case study of Mumbai illustrates redevelopmental state spaces that suture ethno-religious nationalism, urbanized accumulation and populist welfare to unevenly distribute life capacities, garnering both cooperation and contestation. The article concludes by suggesting ways this spatially attuned framing can provide insights into the recent rise of ethno-nationalism and authoritarian populism around the world.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, urbanization has accompanied new configurations of developmental governance as states attempt to reconcile two contradictory global processes. On the one hand, the imperatives

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of national growth and transnational finance induce large-scale land dispossessions (Harvey, 2003; Sassen, 2014) as states promote ‘world-class’ real estate and infrastructure projects that threaten life and livelihoods in city regions (Goldman, 2011; Shin and Kim, 2016; Watson, 2014). Defying standard Marxist understandings of primitive accumulation, the jobless growth produced by such projects displaces and renders millions of people surplus to capitalist economies (Li, 2010). On the other hand, states must also engage with demands from people living in precarious conditions, especially in urban centres, and offer assistance to address basic needs (Chatterjee, 2011; Ferguson, 2015; Goodale and Posteru, 2013). Following recent calls to rethink developmental states to attend to welfare interventions in cities (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010), this article theorizes how the contradictory imperatives of dispossessioning accumulation and welfarist inclusion are reconciled (or not) through a politico-spatial framing I call the ‘redevelopmental state’.

To speak of the redevelopmental state is to conceptualize the spaces, territorial modalities and meanings through which governance is made and remade in the creative destruction of capitalist urbanization. Whereas Northern theories of urban redevelopment governance are less attentive to the specificities of post-colonial cities and developmental state scholarship has not traditionally focused on urban space, the lens of redevelopment — in the dual sense of repeating and remaking post-colonial development — offers an alternative and dynamic spatial theory of rule for the contemporary era. I elaborate this in two theoretical sections followed by an illustrative case study from India. First, I situate redevelopment within recent theories of the developmental state and emphasize the need for these theories to engage the spatial dimensions of urbanization along two registers. One register is the role of the state in mediating dispossessioning land-based projects in the context of declining agrarian livelihoods and urbanization with incomplete labour absorption. Here the state advances developmental accumulation through changing territorial and social governing arrangements aimed at facilitating both land acquisition and the distribution of compensation and welfare to the dispossessed and underemployed. A second related register locates urban land governance not only within formal state bodies and policies but also in the spaces of everyday social life, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), cultural institutions and political participation that shape urban territorial rule and welfare distribution. This spatially fluid approach borrows from Foucauldian and Gramscian theories of developmentalism which see rule as an unbounded process working through and beyond formal government agencies and policies into the domain of social sites, meanings and discursive technologies.

Next, I further this spatio-political investigation of development governance with a deeper focus on urbanization and critical engagement with theories of neoliberal and post-colonial urbanism, gentrification, dispossession, informality and new state spaces. In line with critiques of theories of
planetary urbanization’, ‘global cities’ and the ‘urban age’ (Robinson, 2002; Roy, 2016; Sheppard et al., 2015), I argue that state-led land usurpation and the politics of welfare distribution in Southern cities requires attention to spatial governance politics that are under-addressed in dominant framings. Specifically, this includes state-led forms of informal and developmental land governance and the role of city dwellers’ political participation in both formal and ‘non-state’ spaces. I argue that land-use regulation, dispossession, benefits distribution and claims to entitlement among surplus populations in cities unfold through flexible territorial logics and illiberal social relations that shape, and exceed, formal policy and institutional arenas.

Attention to these dynamics reveals how ‘the state’ is expressed in geographical spaces of everyday life, struggle and negotiation that extend from the offices of elected officials and bureaucrats through places of worship, street corners and homes. By locating the state in these sites, I deploy a Gramscian notion of the state as a contested and historically specific formation of capitalist rule working through both formal and societal spaces. These blurred arenas of rule facilitate governing processes by enlisting consent for redevelopment interventions through ideological practices and material accommodations and also by deploying targeted violence and force. The redevelopmental state operates through simultaneously inclusive and exclusionary meanings that drive urban identities, spatial imaginaries of belonging, worthiness and desire. Such discursive practices shape political subjectivities and experiences of welfare and dispossession and undergird whether and how state legitimacy is forged at key moments of crisis. This leads to the final aspect of state spatialization that I explore: the arena of cultural politics and, specifically, the role of ethno-racial nationalism and populist aspiration. Cultural politics brings our attention to political subjectivity, which may be conceived as an embodied space of rule that differentially enlists and punishes urban dwellers affected by redevelopment. Because such formations of rule exhibit both change and continuity over time — especially when faced with contestations and negotiations — I suggest a conjunctural approach that conceptualizes the redevelopmental state not as predetermined or fixed but as an historically shifting struggle over hegemony.

I then turn to a case study of redevelopmental rule in India. Since the 1990s, India’s rapid growth has been connected to elite-dominated urban economic geographies of global services. World-class cities and service sectors have failed to integrate the millions who are displaced or dispossessed by these very growth strategies, presenting a formidable political liability (Shatkin, 2013). Despite rhetorics of free markets and minimalist government, proactive national and subnational states promote urbanized development through polarizing slum clearance and redevelopment, Special Economic Zone projects, and new townships. Of course, in Southern contexts, such dynamics are not new; colonial extractive economies and post-colonial development have always advanced through land and resource grabs and limited ameliorative interventions. What is distinctive about
Indian development today is the increasingly urban character of projects and struggles, which is, ironically, out of step with the scale and pace of actual urbanization. Despite the Malthusian panic over megacities, urban population growth has been relatively slow in India; indeed, the urban population remains under 40 per cent to date. There has been a proliferation of land-based real estate and infrastructural projects (Levien, 2013) and non-agrarian welfare interventions (Roy, 2016) in what might otherwise be considered rural space.

Focusing on Mumbai, I show how accumulation and accommodation converge with Hindu nationalist and aspirational ideologies and changing spaces of political participation and rule operating through and beyond formal state bodies, producing contradictory political subjectivities. The upper classes demand the world-class urban infrastructure, housing and leisure spaces offered by redevelopment. Meanwhile, the poor and dispossessed who live and work in informal settlements known as ‘slums’ often embrace the promise of development as improved living offered via resettlement, housing upgrades and basic service provisions that are yoked to urban renewal interventions. Yet for many among them — especially those facing identity-based marginalization — redevelopment is experienced as exclusion, violence and dispossession. These uneven distributions, dispossessions and notions of belonging and aspiration constitute the coercive and persuasive means through which redevelopment hegemony is forged and comes to be contested. I conclude by suggesting ways this framing may orient thinking on the recent global rise of ethno-nationalist and authoritarianism populism through the politics of uneven development.

RETHINKING THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Recent theories of the state and development have recalibrated to attend to global economic integration and urbanization, shifting away from earlier preoccupations with growth and industrial transition toward greater attention to the state’s role in welfare. This section reviews these theories, underscoring the need for historically and spatially attuned conceptions of the state.

Developmental States: From Growth to Welfare

Founded on the now questionable assumption that the right interventions can enable non-industrialized countries to move towards a fully employed modern economy, the developmental state is among the most durable framings by which political economic change has been conceptualized in the non-Western world. Introduced by Chalmers Johnson (1982) and re formulated by others (see Woo-Cumings, 1999), developmental state theory has looked to late industrializing East Asian countries to gain insight into
The Redevelopmental State

how regimes outside the West promote economic transition. The framing was most famously applied by sociologist Peter Evans (1995), who used Korea and Taiwan as yardsticks for gauging the quality, form and balance of state autonomy and linkages with diverse socio-economic groups within developing countries. Critiquing free-market dogma, Evans found uneven results where unaccountable, captured and weak states like Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) exemplified ‘predatory’ despotic and extractive tendencies that thwarted beneficial social and economic transition. Meanwhile, ‘intermediate’ states like Brazil and India experienced uneven success in industrialization due to imbalanced mixes of independence and symbiosis with domestic economic actors.

Recently, Evans and Heller (2015) have redefined developmentalism beyond growth to examine the state’s role in the enhancement of human capacity, arguing that economic development is impeded when states neglect education, healthcare and other aspects of human welfare. Through a Senian capability-centred approach, they demonstrate that states matter for advancing human capacity and consider the political dynamics that make them more or less successful in this endeavour. In their view, state performance emerges from bureaucratic competency and engagement with a robust civil society. Comparing China, Korea, Taiwan, India and Brazil, they argue that redistributive goals are best achieved when states work closely with strong civil societies while retaining a sufficient level of autonomy rather than narrowly advancing the patronage of particular interest groups.

While offering important correctives to neoliberal economism, this institutionalist approach remains limited. Most significantly the ideal typical framing of national states and civil societies as discrete entities obscures how state and social practices are co-constituted in concrete local development processes and (trans)nationally circulating ideologies. More to the point, the theoretical separation of governance from social life makes it difficult to understand how states come to embody narrow interests. Furthermore, in many cases, the underlying assumption that human capacity will support full employment remains. Developmental state theories have thus relatedly been critiqued for taking an aspatial and historically shallow approach (Hart, 2002) that reads post-colonial societies in derivative terms (Chatterjee, 2011) or reifies the nation state while eliding more fluid, transnational logics of rule (Ong, 2006). Still, theories of rule that highlight spatial processes related to welfare and accumulation remain salient to politics and life in urbanizing places.

Developmental Biopolitics, Governmentality and Urbanizing Surplus Populations

In a different vein, theorists have deployed the Foucauldian concept of biopolitics and governmentality to rethink contemporary development,
welfare and spatializations of rule. For Foucault (2003), biopolitics emerged as 17th century European states shifted from a ‘making die and letting live’ disposition, in which territory was ruled through violence, towards a ‘making live and letting die’ imperative that targeted bodies through disciplining techniques aimed at life enhancement (ibid.: 247). While Foucault saw biopolitics as indispensable to the productivist labour demands of industrial capitalism, scholars of post-colonial development have applied it differently. For instance, Tania Li (2010) examines state-supported ‘make live’ efforts — such as food and health campaigns — aimed at millions of under-employed people in rural Asia who are rendered surplus by capitalist forces that absorb land and resources but not the labour of the dispossessed.

That such dispossessed groups increasingly live and work in urban and/or non-agrarian settlements is the concern of a second set of Foucault-inspired, Gramscian–Marxist approaches to the state and development. Most notably, Kalyan Sanyal (2007) calls for a rethinking of post-colonial capitalism, development and the state via the respective concepts of primitive accumulation, governmentality and hegemony. Like Li, he counters teleologies of capitalism that assume primitive accumulation ultimately leads to the absorption of pre-capitalist labour into industrial economies and market relations. Rather, most of the world’s dispossessed inhabit a vast ‘need economy’ of non-agrarian informal labour, commerce and production that does not significantly accumulate nor benefit from dominant capitalist economies. Unlike institutional perspectives, Sanyal sees social marginalization and poverty not as the failure of weak states and societies but as intrinsic to post-colonial capitalism — defined as a ‘complex of capitalist and non-capitalist production’ (ibid.: 7). He notes that, since the 1970s, regimes have attended to the survival needs of the dispossessed through governmental anti-poverty measures that increasingly target urban spaces for intervention because of the predominance of informal economic and social reproductive activities. For Sanyal, the developmental state is legitimized through this governmental management of poverty, a formulation that inspires Chatterjee’s (2011) famous theory of subaltern mobilization, to which I return below.

It is important to remember that, despite biopolitical welfare, vulnerability to premature death still looms large in much of the world. Akhil Gupta (2012) argues that Foucauldian biopolitics underemphasizes the ongoing role of ‘making die’ sovereign power, which is evident in the persistence and normalization of preventable deaths among the poor. He calls for a ‘thanatopolitical’ theory of the state as a site of structural violence that works not only through force but also ironically through ostensibly beneficial and inclusive welfare. Gupta rightly eschews notions of the state as

1. Thanatopolitics refers to the politics of death. It stands in contrast to Foucault’s biopolitics, which focuses on the prolongation of life as the key feature of the modern state. For Gupta, high rates of early and preventable mortality in Indian and other developing-world contexts indicates the need for greater attention to violence and death.
a coherent entity, a stance corroborated by Mitchell’s (1999) ‘state effect’ approach. Instead, he traces the disaggregated spaces of everyday encounters in villages where state programmes systematically fail to adequately deliver life-saving welfare due to arbitrary indifference and imprecision among bureaucratic staff. However, while Gupta usefully illuminates the spatiality and invisible violence of the bureaucratic state, his emphasis on arbitrariness has the effect of underplaying systemic marginalization and violence linked to gender, racial, caste, religious and ethnic differentiations and ideologies. Foucault himself stressed that biopolitics remains deeply steeped in racial logics of war, nation and security that deny life by actively excluding or punishing internal and external ‘others’ (McIntyre and Nast, 2011). Such vulnerabilities may also be distributed through exploitative forms of feminized inclusion, as with the ubiquitous reliance on the cheap or unpaid labour of women whose naturalized responsibilities as caregivers are instrumentalized in programmes (Chant, 2008).

Such uneven and shifting ideologies of inclusion and exclusion profoundly shape subjectivities and highlight the need to investigate differentiated spaces of rule. As part of the now well-established governmentality literature, several scholars have sought to examine how development is enacted through rationalities that enable the process of governing at a distance. For instance, Michael Watts examines how spaces are rendered governable or ungovernable through ‘a more or less calculated and rational set of ways of shaping conduct and of securing rule through a multiplicity of authorities and agencies in and outside of the state and at a variety of spatial levels’ (Watts, 2003: 13). Welfare, human rights, and citizenship are also fragmented and redistributed through identity-based hierarchies, what Ong (2006: 194) calls ‘ethnic governmentality’. Meanwhile, Ferguson and Gupta (2002) note how governmental techniques create a sense of state dominance over space while also enrolling NGOs and other local and transnational agents engaged in ‘state-like’ activities. Development governmentality often deploys individualizing, market-based techniques that enrol beneficiaries — especially women — as ‘empowered’ entrepreneurial subjects through programmes like micro-credit (Rankin, 2001). This does not mean the retreat of the state. Indeed, many groups are government-organized (Sharma, 2006), connect with party politics, or funnel public resources.

By focusing on logics of rule rather than discrete institutions, theories of development governmentality and biopolitics allow for more granular and fluid analyses of state spatiality. At their methodological core, however, Foucauldian approaches are less attentive to historical material forces than Marxian analyses. The tendency is to position (neo)liberal capitalist accumulation as the given context rather than as actively produced and influenced by struggles over meanings and resources. Questions remain as to how developmental logics become infused with particular socio-cultural meanings to bolster hegemony in moments of urban struggle and crisis. One of the most
significant arenas of such struggles is around urban land and resource dispossession, which requires supplementing Foucauldian approaches with Marxist analysis as several of the aforementioned scholars have done for rural contexts. While the intersection of entitlement struggles, governance and urban land is an emerging research agenda (Roy, 2016), questions of ideology, subject formation and developmental hegemony warrant more extensive theorization in the context of urbanization. The urban land question is surprisingly missing from Sanyal’s otherwise systematic Gramscian-inspired theory that ‘development as governmentality’ (Sanyal, 2007: 176) arises as an effort to mitigate primitive accumulation. As Gidwani and Wainwright (2014) point out, rural and urban development schemes — from slum redevelopment to dam projects — often enact rather than reverse primitive accumulation. Here struggles over the social reproductive dimensions of land — including urban housing and services — may become disconnected from production and livelihoods concerns to shape development politics and hegemony in complex ways (Casolo and Doshi, 2013). As I argue below, welfare is indelibly shaped at key moments of cultural and material struggle over uneven capitalist urbanization. Urban land-based developments entail both life-enhancing and life-threatening power and unfold through sites, processes and meanings that traverse the formal boundaries of the state. Ascertaining whether and how such contradictions are sorted requires a dynamic theory of developmental rule that is attentive to urbanization.

REDEVELOPMENT AND STATE SPACE IN THE ‘URBAN AGE’

If jobless accumulation and global urbanization require a reframing of developmental state theory, dominant Northern urban framings must also be recalibrated to address ruling formations in post-colonial cities. This section engages theories of urban governance, drawing attention to three spatial aspects of post-colonial urban rule: informal and developmental territoriality in land; spaces of participation and rule through and beyond the formal state; and ideologies as arenas of hegemony and subject formation.

State Space, Territory and Urban Land in the Post-colony

Most redevelopment and urban governance theories focus on two phenomena, conceived from Euro-American urban experiences: gentrification and rescaled state spaces. Neil Smith’s now-classic (1996) theory of rent gaps explains how systematic disinvestment in neighbourhoods occupied by low-income communities paves the way for new rounds of accumulation through displacing urban renewal. In this reading, gentrification is part of a larger process of redevelopment driven primarily by the flow of capital in and out of already commodified urban space, with states and exclusionary
ideologies playing a supporting role. Recently, urban theorists have questioned whether and how gentrification theory applies to non-Western urban displacements (Lees et al., 2015), underscoring diverse informal tenure regimes, non-commodified land uses, and the more direct role of states and extra-economic forces in making land available for urban redevelopment (Doshi, 2015; Ghertner, 2015a). This includes direct land acquisition for debt-based infrastructural development projects, special sporting events, township projects and other ‘high-priority’ world-city projects via slum evictions, informal land grabs and eminent domain (Gaffney, 2010; Shin and Kim, 2016; Watson, 2014). Such state-led and extra-economic land usurpations resemble instantiations of accumulation by dispossession (Banerjee-Guha, 2010) rather than gentrification through market-driven rent gaps.

Neil Brenner’s (2004) work on ‘new state spaces’ offers some useful tools for conceptualizing urban governance by underscoring the importance of subnational states. Brenner analyses the new forms of rescaled governance targeting cities that have emerged alongside neoliberal economic integration efforts in Europe. Attention to state space, he argues, helps to illuminate how regimes respond to global economic forces without overemphasizing national territory as the principal scale of state intervention. Linked to a broader, variegated approach to neoliberalism (Brenner et al., 2010), Brenner draws on Lefebvre and Polanyi to attend to the dual role of local states in advancing urban entrepreneurial strategies and global market-oriented regulatory reforms while also responding to the uneven social fallouts of these interventions. In this view, generalized political economic processes intersect with local and extra-market dynamics to create diverse path-dependent regimes that nonetheless share common neoliberalizing ground.

Post-colonial development politics demands recalibration of this framing as well, however. To start, it is necessary to question narrow conceptualizations of ‘neoliberalism’ as applied to Southern urban contexts. One prominent effort is Parnell and Robinson’s (2012) critique of neoliberal urbanism, which, they argue, elides the experiences of many world cities. Moving beyond the post-Fordist concerns of ‘advanced capitalist’ societies, they insist on post-colonial temporalities of social struggle, highlighting the South African example of state restructuring, service delivery and post-apartheid transition. Similarly, Ong (2006) argues that in East Asia neoliberalism is not always the principal logic of spatial governance; rather, modalities of rule are often undergirded by ethnicized and gendered regimes of graduated citizenship. Mineral extraction-based African economies exhibit privatized gated cities and ‘thin’ enclave-based regimes in some instances (Watson, 2014) and social welfare infrastructures in others (Ferguson, 2015). Parnell and Robinson therefore emphasize a ‘radical (re)contextualization’ of urban neoliberalism within wider political trajectories, underscoring ‘the need for new theories of the local state in the wake of a
A second concern is the ubiquity of informality in land use, social reproduction and livelihoods in Southern cities. The focus on institutions and policy regimes within much of the debate around neoliberal cities obscures the spatial politics of informality in which state-led, extra-economic land acquisitions are embedded. Southern urban regimes flexibly deploy law to tacitly allow, regulate or banish lower income groups’ informal land uses (slum settlements and street vending for example) while also allowing, or ex post legalizing, elite informal real estate projects that flout zoning laws or launder money (Varley, 2013; Yiftachel, 2009). Governing urban land and redevelopment outside the Euro-American context may thus be better understood through Ananya Roy’s concept of informality as a flexible territorial regime of ‘deregulation’ (2009: 83) which dispels commonplace emphases on planning failure and the economies of the poor. Rather than dwelling on the divide between formality and informality, Roy emphasizes differentiations within informality that allow for flexibility to shift land-uses to respond to diverse political demands. As neoliberal economic transformations lead to further targeting of land for accumulationist projects, the politics of informality becomes all the more salient. This perspective responds to calls to examine ‘not only the role of the state in shaping land deals, but the inner workings of states in shaping new understandings and articulations of territory, sovereignty, authority and subjects’ (Wolford et al., 2013: 195). Just as they do in rural and forest contexts (Corson, 2011), non-state entities play a critical role in establishing territorial control over land in the service of accumulation in cities.

Meanings, Practices and Spaces of Political Participation

Research on informality in Southern cities has also examined diverse, so-called ‘non-state’ spaces of participation and modalities of rule that articulate with, reinforce or challenge urban governing regimes. For instance, Holston celebrates Brazilian informal settlements as sites of ‘insurgent citizenship’ that invert criminalizing discourses normally waged against the poor (Holston, 2008). Other work focuses on horizontal global coalitions of slum residents that negotiate better living conditions by leveraging connections with NGOs, state agencies and international development organizations (Appadurai, 2001). Studies also demonstrate the limits of ostensibly democratizing participation in urban NGOs and social movements, highlighting dominant group co-optation (de Wit and Berner, 2009) and elite-biased neoliberal programmes (Doshi, 2013). However, we cannot predict co-optation or insurgency from the outset. Miraftab’s (2009) study of South African cities, for instance, demonstrates that the urban poor may submit to, leverage, or subvert ‘invited spaces’ of political participation in elite-sanctioned
programmes while also building more visibly confrontational ‘invented spaces’ (ibid.: 33).

Beyond inclusive (neoliberal) governmentality, urban rule also advances through privatized, exclusionary and illiberal arenas. Most famously, Chatterjee (2011) highlights the democratizing aspects of subaltern political engagement but rejects the rubric of liberal civil society. Chatterjee argues that because the informal urban poor are relegated to illegal housing and livelihoods, they lack the formal-legal rights-claims of property-owning bourgeoisie. Instead, they negotiate claims to governmental programmes through ethnicity, religion and other family-like solidarities. Relatedly, extra-state ‘informal sovereigns’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2006: 305), such as gangs or religious groups in Brazilian cities (Garmany, 2010, 2014), distribute basic needs and security but also deploy the threat of force. In Egyptian cities, diverse local authorities ranging from government officials and religious clerics to real estate developers and businessmen mediate governmental programmes and undergird authoritarianism through what Salwa Ismail calls ‘society in the state’ (2006: 47). These and other studies extend beyond policy and institutions to address the diverse systems of meaning shaping urban subjectivities.

Here, then, is a final facet of state spatialization: the domain of cultural politics, urban imaginaries and subjectivities. In the context of redevelopment, state space operates through ideologies that sometimes enlist consenting participation in urban programmes and, in other instances, legitimate violence and forced dispossession. Pro-redevelopment aesthetics and desires for ‘world-class’ infrastructure, consumption spaces and housing are well-documented among the upper and middle classes (Fernandes and Heller, 2006; Mercer, 2014). Yet studies show how the urban poor are also enrolled in aspirations for improved living and formalized property ownership through upgrading and resettlement. These future-oriented visions motivate and shape consent and participation, which in turn fuels tensions or new strategies as projects are thwarted by the limits of neoliberal programmes that remain oriented towards upper classes (Erman, 2016; Koster and Nuijten, 2012). As Appadurai (2004) has argued, aspirations must be understood in relation to broader systems of social meaning that skew distributions of capacities and privileges towards elites. For instance, Bunnel and Goh (2012) show how long-standing nationalist ideologies of development were reinvented through special events, housing projects and urban renewal in Singapore. In this and other cases, the state plays a critical role in cultivating nationalist aspirations through both heritage memorialization and real estate promotion. Such interventions implicate the urban poor in contradictory ways. Aspirations serve as cultural terrains ‘over which the powerful and the subaltern battle to shape the city, but . . . also where new alliances and solidarities among members of these groups are forged’ (ibid.: 3).
Nationalist aspirations and spatial imaginaries may also advance exclusionary notions of belonging that significantly shape (re)development outcomes. As I have mentioned, discourses of worthiness and belonging define who deserves welfare and who does not along class, ethnicity, race and other axes of difference. While identity-based segregation and displacement is well-documented in cities, such processes increasingly articulate with xenophobic nationalism. Gibson (2012) shows how national leaders, local officials and citizens have promoted xenophobic violence in Durban’s shanty towns by blaming black ‘illegal aliens’ from other African countries for many ills. Populist Zulu nationalism expresses a ‘neoapartheid South Africa [that] is built on a racial capitalism legitimized by the discourse of black economic empowerment’ that manifests through struggles over urban space (ibid.: 56). Such exclusionary spatial imaginaries territorialize cities through state-led and society-backed practices of dispossession and violence. They justify the targeted and uncompensated evictions of Kurds in Istanbul (Zayim, 2014), minorities and immigrants in Kenya (Otiso, 2002), Muslims in India (Chatterji and Mehta, 2007), and Bedouins in Israel-Palestine (Yiftachel, 2009).

The Redevelopmental State: A Conjunctural Approach

How do we make sense of the state in relation to these spaces of redevelopment politics? I suggest a conjunctural approach for understanding not only how countervailing social forces converge and territorialize through urban space but also the political possibilities and limits produced therein. By illuminating the connections between culture, social difference, political economy and the state, diverse conjunctural approaches have been usefully mobilized to analyse capitalistic formations and struggles without resorting to economic determinism (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008; Pickles, 2012; Sheppard et al., 2015; Werner et al., 2017). My framing shares much with, and builds on, this body of work through attention to the globally interconnected political economic histories, informal territorialities, governing spaces and meanings of post-colonial urban redevelopment.

Specifically, I follow Stuart Hall’s Gramscian-inspired definition of conjuncture as a ‘period during which the different social, political, economic and ideological contradictions that are at work in society come together to give it a specific and distinctive shape’ (Hall and Massey, 2010: 57). Dominant orders secure hegemony under contradictory conditions by ‘winning consent through the complex articulations of different social forces that do not necessarily correspond to simple class terms’ (ibid.: 63). For instance, class and race/ethnicity may articulate in distinct ways in different contexts and historical moments (Hall, 1996). The principal site of struggles over material and cultural hegemony is the state — which in Gramscian terms includes formal and electoral domains of political society as well as arenas
of civil society and ideology, backed to varying degrees by coercive force. In this view, redevelopmental hegemony is never permanent but must constantly be renewed, especially in moments of crisis. Redevelopment also exemplifies Hart’s notion of ‘D/development’, a dialectical unity whereby interventions both advance and mitigate capitalist creative destruction. Hart (2010) distinguishes ‘little d’ and ‘big D’ development, where the former constitutes the geographically and historically uneven processes of capitalist development and the latter refers to post-colonial projects of improvement undertaken by diverse state and social agents. D/developmental governance congeals place-specific and globally interconnected social processes rife with frictions, contestations and negotiations.

I accordingly define the redevelopmental state as a conjunctural node in which social forces and ideologies coalesce and shape state spatial practice around urban welfare and dispossession. This approach reorients theories of development governance in significant ways. With its urban spatiality and global orientation, redevelopment is distinct from previous rounds of national agrarian and industrial modernization paradigms. Domestic and transnational financiers, corporate capital, builders and real estate speculators target land for urban projects depending on market fluctuations and state interventions in the economy. In the process, urban redevelopment then serves to re-enact ‘D/development’, whereby states support accumulation and land-based dispossession that produce growth with few job prospects while simultaneously mitigating fallouts and distributing basic needs to retain stability. Furthermore, redevelopment ideologies decry the failures of past developments — exemplified, for instance, in slums — and nurture future-oriented aspirations, encompassing both inclusive and exclusionary spatial imaginaries. Here, redevelopment may become wedded to or repackaged as welfare and improved living to those who have been dispossessed by present or previous rounds of accumulation. However, it is critical to note that not all are able to benefit equally. Alongside ‘inclusive’ arrangements, states and upper classes continue to punish, criminalize and displace those among the poor deemed ‘undeserving’. The recent global rise of ethno-racial nationalism and violence has recalibrated these discourses through notions of belonging to unevenly code and distribute care and dispossession (Wilhelm-Solomon, 2016) and thereby bolster state legitimacy under potentially volatile conditions. While I focus on the Indian conjuncture below, similar urban dynamics exist in Africa (Choplin and Ciavolella, 2016), Latin America (Koster and Nuijten, 2012), and Asia (Shin and Kim, 2016). Conjunctural analysis reveals how and when these governing spaces and meanings gain salience to consolidate state hegemony. The Indian case elucidates the spatio-political practices, imaginaries and stakes of the redevelopmental state, forged in a conjuncture of Hindu nationalist and aspirational development desires, liberalization-induced urban accumulation and dispossession, and struggles for welfare and improved living.
THE REDEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN INDIA

‘I am known to be a Hindutva leader . . . but I dare to say, my real thought is: “Pehle shauchalaya, phir devalaya” (toilets first, temples later)’ Narendra Modi (Times of India, 2013)

In 2014, Narendra Modi, the charismatic leader of the state of Gujarat, catapulted into India’s highest public office with a state and parliamentary supermajority for his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). With most votes coming from urban areas (Jaffrelot and Kumar, 2015), Indians across class boundaries seemed to put their faith in Modi’s authoritarian ‘get development done’ brand, which promised smart cities, corruption-free government, global economic competitiveness and the good life for all. Still, some recalled Modi’s questionable role in the infamous 2002 Hindu–Muslim Gujarat riots and asked: ‘Is [Modi] a leader who will prioritize development . . .? Or will he revert to his Hindu Nationalist roots and impose a sectarian agenda?’ (Pilling, 2014). In dichotomizing development and communal violence, such questions ignore the suturing of the cultural politics of ethno-religious nationalism and aspiration with the material struggles over urbanized accumulation and populist welfare which was central to Modi’s rise. This section examines the forging of hegemonic redevelopmental rule in India with a focus on Mumbai.

Conjuncture: Liberalization, Urbanized Development and Hindutva 1991–2017

The current conjuncture is marked by India’s first major rounds of economic liberalization in 1991, launched in the crucible of debt crisis and ideological attacks on protectionist planning and continuing in contested spurts to the present. Liberalization and pro-business policies have primarily aided growth in the service economy (Kohli, 2012) — including finance, business processing, insurance, information technology, transport and real estate — which contributed 52 per cent of the national GDP but only 30 per cent of jobs in 2016 (GoI, 2018). The small-scale agriculture, petty commodity production and informal activities in which the majority of Indians are employed have been neglected or undercut, placing lower-caste groups, ethno-religious minorities and women in especially precarious positions (Harriss-White, 2014). Such uneven processes challenge simplistic Marxist readings focused solely on class (Omvedt, 2005). Liberalization has also entailed mounting struggles over urban space. Demand for residential, leisure and office space among enriched upper and middle classes, local and foreign businesses and investors, and non-resident Indians has fuelled real estate market surges and crowded out lower-income groups. In response, the central government deepened land deregulation throughout the 2000s, through lifting rent controls and landholding restrictions, public–private partnerships, utility user service charges, and property tax reform (Shatkin,
The Redevelopmental State

2013). The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) — a federal initiative that aimed to mobilize private finance to modernize infrastructure — furthered deregulation at the state level by tying federal funding to reform and cost-recovery conditionalities (Baindur and Kamath, 2009). While claiming to offer improved infrastructure for all urban citizens, debt-financed projects have primarily catered to service and corporate sectors in large cities (Mahadevia, 2011). Foreign direct investment (FDI) easements for township and infrastructure development further prompted surges in speculative FDI in real estate in cities and peri-urban corridors from US$ 0.04 billion in 2005 to US$ 2.94 billion in 2009 (KPMG, 2014).

These political economic pressures of liberalization and urban development have articulated with cultural political geographies of aspiration (Hill, 2016). Global service sectors hold great symbolic force in national development imaginaries and are matched by the ‘world-class’ urban aesthetics and consumption desires of upper- and middle-income groups (Ghertner, 2015b). Meanwhile, new migrants seeking freedom from agrarian drudgery and caste oppressions in rural areas (Gidwani, 2015; Gooptu, 2009; Jeffrey et al., 2008), along with earlier settled poor and lower-middle-class urban residents, also harbour aspirations of improved housing, often through slum upgrading or resettlement. The revamping of the BJP image under Modi — seen as a self-made tea seller who delivered globalized economic prosperity for all in his home state of Gujarat2 — spoke directly to these cross-class ambitions. However, inclusive aspirational ideologies also articulate with the exclusions of ethno-religious and caste violence, evictions and other struggles. Indian aspirational cultures thus must be historicized alongside Hindutva, the ideology of ‘Hindu-ness’ undergirding right-wing nationalism (Fernandes and Heller, 2006).

Birthed within colonial independence struggles, Hindu nationalism expanded and morphed alongside (neo)liberalization and urbanization. Seizing on the legitimacy crisis of Nehruvian development epitomized by the corruption-ridden Congress Party, the militant Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) — National Service Organization — and its sister groups embarked on a mission to ‘revive’ Hindu culture in the face of the perceived degradations of Muslims and their secularist allies in the 1980s and 1990s. These movements gained footing in electoral politics by affiliating with local and national parties and at the grassroots level through school building, curriculum revisions, and health and recreational campaigns (Hansen, 1999). Deshpande (1998) theorizes Hindutva as a hegemonic spatial strategy for creating an imagined national cultural heritage that subsumes hierarchies of caste, class and ethno-linguistic difference while excluding others seen as anti-national, especially Muslims. In this way, Deshpande sees Hindutva as a rejection of Nehruvian nation-space imaginaries based

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2. ‘Gujarat model’ claims of prosperity with poverty reduction have been discredited by some (see Dreze, 2014).
on economic geographies of modernization. Instead, Hindutva projects an intimate spiritual geography of belonging based on the reclamation of urban public spaces and sacred sites supposedly usurped by Muslims. This project took an explosive turn in 1993, when the RSS demolished a mosque in the northern city of Ayodhya supposedly constructed on a Hindu god’s birth site. Riots ensued across India resulting in the rape and killing of thousands, with Muslims suffering the highest toll and damage. Here the city qua Hindu nation fused the remaking of history, the questioning of Muslim rights to land, and the violent cleansing of Muslim symbols and bodies from neighbourhoods and public spaces. These nationalist urban imaginaries entwined with other political economic and social struggles.

Corbridge and Harriss (2000) adeptly trace Hindutva’s rise through a series of urban ‘elite revolts’ against state policy — including campaigns against affirmative action style reservations for lower-caste Indians in education and government. These mobilizations fused anti-poor and casteist politics with culturalist projects seeking to punish religious minorities. Hindutva has also uneasily attempted to enrol the poor and lower castes through both symbolic-political and material accommodations (Teltumbde, 2005, 2016). Modi’s leadership played a decisive role in the BJP’s electoral success, in part because of his lower-caste status, which contributed to Hindutva’s inclusivity claims (Jaffrelot, 2015). But hegemonic inclusion has by no means meant caste equality in both social and economic terms (Teltumbde, 2016). Muslims suffering high rates of poverty remain vilified through rhetorics of sedition, marginalized in social welfare schemes and demeaned as socially backward (Fazal, 2013). Liberalization, welfare politics, Hindutva and struggles over urban land and resources have converged in Indian cities in diverse ways. Understanding how tensions bubble up, find resolution, and re-emerge requires a deeper analysis of spatial formations of rule and subjectivity in Indian cities.

**Redeveloping State Spaces: The Governance of Welfare and Land in Urban India**

Pressures to reconcile conflicting accumulationist and social demands around land and welfare spawned by the conjuncture of liberalization, Hindutva and aspirational politics have reconfigured state spatial practice throughout Indian cities. Before delving into a case study of Mumbai, a few general trends are worth noting. First, since the 2000s, liberalization has advanced alongside (still vastly inadequate) increases in welfare programmes for populations that have been left behind (Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan, 2010), exemplifying ‘inclusive growth’ development discourses. They include child- and maternal-health and education programmes and minimal income offerings through the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in villages, and basic services, slum upgrading and resettlement for the
poor in metros and towns through the aforementioned JNNURM and other schemes. Numerous studies demonstrate how such benefits are distributed through ethnic patronage practices that both benefit and undermine the poor (Chandra, 2007; Corbridge et al., 2005). In 2010, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation launched the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY), a housing plan named after former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, to address housing inadequacies. Billed as ‘a new deal for the urban poor’ (Mathur, 2009), RAY sought to eradicate slums throughout India in 10 years through titling, upgraded housing and improved service provision using high-tech satellite mapping and surveying instruments. Though wary of displacement caused by integration into land markets, activists welcomed such efforts (Citizens’ Rights Collective and ActionAid, 2013). The programme was short-lived, however. Due to powerful land and real estate interests, RAY never gained traction in large cities. In 2014, Modi eliminated RAY and introduced the more market-driven ‘Housing for All’ programme. The new programme is based partially on the Mumbai model described below, which seeks to leverage land markets to finance slum resettlement, thereby marrying growth and welfare goals.

To understand how such programmes unfold, we must examine reconfigured territorial modalities of rule and diverse spaces of political influence, participation and meaning making. Laws and practices that fast-track land acquisition for non-agrarian special economic zones, townships and real estate recall long-standing colonial and developmental state eminent domain (Levien, 2013). In urban areas, land acquisition also often operates through the flexible regimes of (in)formal territoriality discussed above. Furthermore, local state channels of participation and influence — including ‘political society’ spaces of municipal party politics (Chatterjee, 2011) and the lower bureaucratic rungs (Benjamin and Bhuvaaneswari, 2001) through which the urban poor have long negotiated eviction stays and service provision — have increasingly been marginalized or colonized by elites and the middle class. Instead, non-elected development authorities and task forces representing corporations, developers and financiers funnel finance for projects and advance land acquisition and slum clearances, bypassing popular municipal politics (Sivaramakrishnan, 2011) while elite-driven informal planning and development pervades new satellite towns (Gururani, 2013). Middle-class resident welfare associations have also leveraged formal and informal networks of influence in local states (Coelho and Venkat, 2009; Ghertner, 2015b) and spurred court-ordered slum evictions through public-interest litigation (Bhan, 2009). These modalities join other illiberal practices such as those of ethnic-caste networks that channel funds and broker real estate and other land-based projects. Such territorialities do not constitute land governance outside of the state but rather rescaled and ‘networked’ subnational states operating through informal relations (Sud, 2017: 76). Such processes challenge Chatterjee’s assertion that informality characterizes mainly the politics of the poor (Baviskar and Sundar, 2008).
This elite colonization of land governance accompanies the weakening of the poor and marginalized caste and ethno-religious groups’ influence and access in municipal bodies. It does not, however, leave a vacuum of participation. Municipal party politics continues to operate alongside or in connection with other ‘non-state’ spaces of participation, such as NGOs and ethno-religious associations that deliver public and privately provisioned housing and services and are intricately involved in slum upgrading and resettlement (Harriss, 2007). These extra-state spaces of rule are ideologically saturated sites that work to shape the desires and subjectivities of affected groups, who in turn embrace, contest or negotiate redevelopmental regimes and interventions. A brief study of Mumbai illuminates how these processes converge to produce tenuously hegemonic redevelopmental rule.

Slum Redevelopment and Subaltern State Spaces in Mumbai

Mumbai’s redevelopmental state congealed during a conjunctural crisis in the early 1990s that sutured neoliberal redevelopment, populism and ethno-nationalism. After a devastating slew of Hindu–Muslim riots, the Shiv Sena, a regionalist and Hindu nationalist party with a long-standing presence in Mumbai’s municipal politics, won the 1994 Maharashtra state elections alongside the BJP at the national level. The Sena defeated the dominant Congress party by seizing on frustrations, across the rural–urban divide, related to corruption and dwindling agrarian supports in villages and to housing crises and skyrocketing real estate markets in cities. Seductive campaign promises of world-class renewal and 4 million free flats for slum dwellers lured the sizable Mumbai electorate. Upon entering office, the Shiv Sena launched the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) as a ‘win-win’ solution for Mumbai’s housing inadequacies and speculative demands on slum land. The cross-subsidy model aimed to eliminate slums by offering incentives to private developers to build resettlement tenements for eligible slum dwellers. By unleashing thousands of square feet for development, SRS has been a boon for builders, corporations and transnational investors. For slum residents, the results have been uneven. Before addressing these impacts, though, we must approach the SRS not simply as a policy but as the manifestation of a transformed landscape of urban governance.

In the 1980s, Hindu nationalism began to significantly shape social life and political participation in Mumbai. A closer look at the Shiv Sena, a grassroots movement-cum-political party that defies simple characterization, illustrates how state space has been transformed through ethno-national politics and imaginaries. Known for its gang-driven bullying tactics against ethno-religious minorities, slum dwellers and ‘Western’ liberal secularists alike, the Sena has a long history of combining social and economic conservatism with ethnic populism. It rose to power in the 1950s as a ‘sons of the soil’ movement championing jobs for Marathi-speaking
Mumbai residents, attacking ethnic minorities and busting labour strikes. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Sena aligned with Hindu nationalist organizations, curried favour with and incorporated Dalits and other lower castes, and redirected its exclusionary spatial practices and imaginaries against Muslims. Sena-led public displays of Hindu prowess (including maha-artis, Hindu rituals normally undertaken in temples and homes) filled entire streets with politico-religious rhetoric, often giving way to mob violence against Muslims (Hansen, 2001).

This ethnic chauvinism combined with a deeply contradictory stance towards slums. The Sena has aggressively promoted slum clearance, redevelopment and transnational urban investment, with leaders claiming central stakes in multi-million-dollar real estate projects. Still, like other political parties, it gained power through municipal politics patronage in poorer neighbourhoods throughout the 1980s. Working through local branches, the Sena promoted Hindu and Marathi cultural activities, facilitated slum regularization and offered eviction stays, water connections, community clean-ups, medical camps, school admissions and jobs to loyal individuals and neighbourhoods (Eckert, 2003). State territorial power has thus operated through co-constituted spaces of ward-level patronage, cultural revival, identity-based politics of belonging and the flexible manipulation of regulatory status for slums. The results of such ethnicized urban politics have been devastating. In the context of a severe housing crisis in 1993, symbolic and material struggles over space converged and reached explosive heights as ethno-religious riots engulfed the city. As Appadurai eloquently described it, ‘spectral housing met ethnic fear, and the Muslim body was the site of this terrifying negotiation’ (2000: 649). Mumbai’s working-class neighbourhoods and Muslims suffered the most devastating damage, leading to large-scale segregation into ghettos (Chatterji and Mehta, 2007). After the riots, less visible violence against Muslims and (more recently) North Indians continues to persist in the form of housing discrimination and exclusions in patronage-based service and benefits distributions. These exclusions intersect with other long-standing class, gender, caste and ethno-religious inequalities (Anand, 2011; Doshi, 2013).

Yet even these ethnicized and illiberal forms of subaltern influence in local government started to erode in the 1990s as unelected parastatal agencies, middle-class residents’ groups and elite task forces gained power in

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3. Mumbai is considered to be a cosmopolitan city with residents from all over India who speak many languages. Yet a major issue of contention since before independence has been different regional groups’ claims to city resources and jobs. The Shiv Sena has gained popularity by capitalizing on the economic marginalization of working-class Marathi speakers and has superficially advocated for their rights to reserved government jobs and resources. The Sena has nonetheless maintained its support for the interests of real estate and industrial capital, which is dominated in large part by Gujarati-speakers and other non-Marathis.

4. The power of elite task forces is exemplified by Vision Mumbai, a document prepared by McKinsey consultants and commissioned by a corporate and real estate lobby-driven task
relation to land-based projects. NGOs and community groups became a central site of participation and negotiation in slums. Among these, the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers (SPARC), an NGO that is world-renowned in international development circles for its participatory best practices, emerged as a key player in slum redevelopment. SPARC’s effectiveness came from its famed pro-development, ‘non-political’ positioning, a strong grassroots base of slum residents (especially women) and connections to and willingness to work with a broad set of state actors and development agencies including the World Bank. The organization’s non-confrontational and collaborative approach was closely tied to a strategy of promoting women’s participation. For instance, early in SPARC’s mobilizational history, women participants de-emphasized confrontational identities as evictees and Muslims, instead engaging as mothers interested in practical development concerns (Doshi, 2013). In the 1990s, when other NGOs refused to work with the Shiv Sena, SPARC extensively participated in high-level policy meetings. Slum-based women took an active role in mobilizing their neighbours around SPARC’s savings, slum surveying and mapping, and home- and toilet-design demonstrations. In the process SPARC (like other NGOs) has inculcated aspirational values through which some slum dwellers have accessed welcome improvements. However, SPARC activities also discipline and encourage residents to reject informal housing practices as uncivil, unsanitary and illegal, thereby prioritizing and legitimating market-oriented state projects over other possibilities. Resettlement in particular has been posited as a path towards improved living through formalization and access to water and sanitation. SPARC soon emerged as the most-contracted NGO for public toilet projects and SRS redevelopment and resettlement throughout Mumbai. Some see SPARC as a progressive alternative to ethnic politics and elite-driven development (Appadurai, 2001). However, as Zérah argues, NGO involvement in slums has reinforced patronage politics as ‘the line between community participation and private subcontracting is blurred’ (2009: 874).

Beyond the question of patronage, I argue that SPARCs’ and other groups’ meaning-making practices and deep connection with state agents and agendas have resulted in some gains for the poor in resettlement and upgrading but have also (inadvertently perhaps) reinforced and legitimated exclusionary practices and developer biases. To illuminate this, let us return now to the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, which fuses resettlement with real estate and other land-based development interests. The aforementioned everyday spatial practices of exclusion and inclusion are embedded in state policy through the SRS’s restrictive eligibility criteria, which protects profitability for developers by limiting access to resettlement. Only residents who can

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force called Bombay First (McKinsey, 2003). Vision Mumbai was unilaterally adopted as the city’s development plan by the Maharashtra government, which undertook a major slum demolition drive the following year, citing the report’s suggestions as the key impetus.
prove residency in Mumbai before a cut-off date of 1 January 1995 (moved to 2000 and 2005 for some agencies) are eligible for resettlement; those who cannot, remain uncompensated. On some plots, resettlement is in situ and the cross-subsidy model allows developers to build additional units for sale at market rates. In cases where land is needed for other ‘public’ purposes — such as environmental protection and transportation infrastructure — developers build offsite resettlement in exchange for coveted development rights in higher-value areas. Eligible slum residents — who constitute a fraction of those threatened with displacement — often receive high-rise flats that are shoddily constructed or too small for growing families and informal economic activities. Slum residents deemed illegal due to the lack of properly dated proof of residence documents necessary for programme eligibility remain excluded from welfare benefits and are evicted with no resettlement. Poorer, newly migrated and marginalized caste and ethno-religious groups experience the deepest exclusions. Eligibility restrictions and targeted evictions are justified through discourses that demonize slum dwellers as freeloaders and Muslims and North Indian migrants as outsiders. This has persisted no matter the party in government, as evidenced by the infamous 2005 demolition sweep that evicted thousands of residents in slums deemed illegal. These state spaces reveal limits to Chatterjee’s (2011) formulation of subaltern participation in political society. His separation of civil and political society does not account for the ways that ideological formations and accommodations around land and housing enmesh with and undergird the hegemony of urban capitalist redevelopment. Through co-constituted spaces of rule and meanings of inclusion and exclusion, slum redevelopment ensures the primacy of accumulation but not life-enhancement for all.

Sedimented and uneven experiences of dispossession have also fomented new popular demands, social mobilizations and subversions. For instance, the famed Dharavi slum redevelopment initiative has remained blocked due to protests over the destruction of informal livelihoods (Weinstein, 2014). While project delay or abandonment in Dharavi and other cases may be partially attributed to real estate market slumps, it would be a mistake to dismiss contestations. Recent ‘anti-corruption’ activism around slum redevelopment supported by a nationally renowned alliance of anti-displacement movements (Doshi and Ranganathan, 2017) has further exposed the opaque collusions, violence and elite informal practices that facilitate land grabbing at the expense of the displaced. Many of these groups vocally reject ethno-national politics of exclusion while others question the dominance of NGOs in redevelopment. At the same time, Shiv Sena politicians and strongmen have also strategically joined some protests against slum redevelopment, thereby suturing class and nativist politics again. The reasons for this go beyond oppositional theatrics. Rather, such frictions shed light on territorial practices of

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5. The World Bank has insisted on more inclusive terms of eligibility in the projects it sponsors, though significant restrictions have remained.
rule based on informal and developmental land uses, material accommodations, non-state political participation and contested symbolic regimes. These diverse micro-politics pose limits to redevelopment hegemony and force adjustments in state practices such as the improvement or expansion of resettlement offerings or even the complete abandonment of projects in some cases.

CONCLUSION

In this article I have argued for a reconceptualization of developmental rule under contentious contemporary processes of urbanization, dispossession and jobless growth. Engaging theories of the developmental state in welfare and accumulation, I argue for greater attention to extra-state governing spaces, the specificities of urbanization and land struggle, and the politics of difference. Turning next to theories of urban political economy and redevelopment, I emphasize the significance of informal and developmental territorialities, arenas of rule and participation stretching through society, and ideologically saturated spatial imaginaries that shape land politics. This reframing of rule offers insights into the spatio-political processes that consolidate and challenge redevelopment hegemony at conjunctures characterized by potentially destabilizing urban transformations. I exemplify these processes through a study of Indian redevelopment, focusing on Mumbai, where state spaces are characterized by: 1) regimes of territoriality that wed accumulationist redevelopment with unevenly distributed ‘improved’ resettlement housing; 2) upper-class colonization of governing bodies and an expansion of extra-state spaces of subaltern participation through NGOs and ethno-religious groups; and 3) simultaneously inclusive and exclusionary ideologies of aspiration and belonging. Here, redevelopmental rule advances life-threatening slum clearances through ostensibly life-enhancing resettlement housing, with (often ethnicized) fault lines dividing those who receive support and compensation from those who experience only dispossession by sovereign force. These differentiated inclusions and dispossessions among the poor undergird the fragile and contested hegemonic state spaces of redevelopment.

Other Indian cities exhibit similar (though not identical) tendencies where forces of market pressures, social welfare demands and ethno-nationalist and aspirational ideologies converge in distinct ways. For instance, in cities like Delhi where fewer evictees are compensated, Rao’s study of aspirational home-making still finds that while ‘slum demolition is a traumatic experience, resettlement also signifies hope for a better future’ (2013: 763). Meanwhile Hindutva cultural politics is expanding but expressed through distinct urban political geographies. Desai (2012) shows how in Ahmedabad, after the 2002 pogroms, redevelopment efforts sought to cleanse the city’s reputation through entrepreneurial imagineering and Hindu nationalist place-making strategies that symbolically erase and physically displace
Muslims in the city. Sanyal (2013) describes a ‘Hindu hegemony’ even in Calcutta — long considered a secular city — whereby simplified narratives of migration during Partition undergird Hindu claims to Muslim-occupied spaces. Such identity-based urban spatial struggles also work through and deepen caste inequalities in cities (Kudva, 2013).

Such battles over urban space, citizenship and welfare partially underpinned national right-wing victories in 1994 and 2014 (Jaffrelot and Kumar, 2015). These dynamics complicate singular class-based analyses, suggesting the salience of cultural politics and fragmented subjectivities. India’s redevelopmental state spaces are not invincible, however, as evidenced by a plethora of recent caste- and class-based revolts in universities, towns and villages (Prakash, 2016) and protests around exclusion, violence and corruption in urban projects. The BJP administration has responded to these movements and media coverage with repression justified by accusations of anti-nationalism. While the 2015 elections saw the waning of support for the BJP, the latest electoral results show growing support for authoritarianism.

Extending beyond India, the redevelopmental state framing can help shed light on recent convergences of ethno-racial nationalism, authoritarian populism and political economic struggle. A focus on state spatial practices and ideologies can help illuminate how ordinary people come to comprehend inequalities and act politically. Authoritarian state violence and policing in cities across the North and the South have long advanced displacing elite projects through discourses of the poor as criminal or undeserving — what Smith calls ‘revanchism’ (1996). While specific contexts must not be collapsed, ethno-nationalist politics associated with the Southern cities discussed in this article are also shaping urban struggles over well-being, dispossession and belonging in Northern contexts. For instance, white populist nationalism and desires for economic inclusion in the USA have had clear spatial-political dimensions, with impoverishment, feelings of insecurity and the loss of jobs in post-industrial towns being blamed on big-city elites, liberals, people of colour and immigrants. Similar dynamics abound in Europe where immigrants are demonized and denied support in moments of mounting inequality, social anxiety and criticisms of global economic instabilities.

What is too often obscured, however, is how these conjunctural struggles unfold and enrol diverse groups in everyday urban spaces of governance, participation and meaning making that blur formal-legal distinctions of state and society. The redevelopmental state framing can help shed light on the spatial practices and meanings through which such hegemonies are forged while also pointing to fragilities and openings for more inclusive politics.

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