Geopolitics

Domesticated Dispossessions? Towards a Transnational Feminist Geopolitics of Development

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Domesticated Dispossessions? Towards a Transnational Feminist Geopolitics of Development

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Geopolitics today is increasingly marked by the violent convergence of (in)security, market integration, and dispossession. Yet few studies address the connected, counter-insurgent geopolitics of ostensibly ameliorative, women-focused development interventions in the (post)colonial world. This paper charts a new theorisation of the geopolitics of development by focusing on gendered social movements, intersecting relations of difference, and social reproduction in two seemingly distinct areas: rural Guatemala and urban India. It introduces a transnational feminist geopolitical analytic – based on relational comparison, critical ethnography, and collaborative dialogue – to elucidate both specificity and global interconnection. Specifically, this consists of analysing struggles over dispossession through processes of 'de(bt)velopment' in the Ch'orti' Highlands and 'redevelopment' in Mumbai at key historical conjunctures. These struggles illuminate not only (in)securities experienced by marginalised groups but also the transformative potentialities and domesticating limitations of social mobilisation. In conclusion, the paper offers insights into the how of doing more liberatory geopolitical praxis.

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INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty years neoliberal development practices tied to geo-economic and geo-political security interventions have created deep social insecurities around the world. Processes of accumulation by dispossession are a key feature of this neoliberal geopolitics of (in)security, where new markets are forged and wealth is appropriated through force, coercion, and extra-capitalist relations beyond the realm of ostensibly free economic exchange. This paper charts a new theorisation of the relationship between geopolitics and accumulation by dispossession arguing that a transnational feminist perspective drawing on both collaborative and comparative methods provides a useful but underutilised lens. In particular, a focus on gendered social movements, intersecting relations of difference, and social reproduction allows for a dynamic reading of the multi-scalar geopolitics of (in)security and dispossession. Here geopolitics is understood not solely as given from above through international security manoeuvres, but constantly produced and reworked through (sometimes contradictory) place-based struggles over meaning and resources. We examine how struggles over dispossession shape geoeconomic and geopolitical trajectories by analytically bringing together two apparently disconnected and discrete places: the urban slums of Mumbai, India, and the barren highlands of eastern Guatemala. In both areas, social conflicts over land, debt, and resource usurpations are inextricably linked to shifting discourses and practices of security and market-oriented development. Such interventions have led to sharpening socio-economic inequalities as well as new forms of political participation.

The paper compares and connects supposedly ameliorative development interventions – rural micro-credit in Guatemala and slum resettlement in Mumbai – that have harnessed the participation of poor women in particular. These feminised modes of participation tied to market-driven strategies emerged in response to women's mobilisation around historically sedimented threats that capitalist development (backed by state violence) posed to gendered arenas of social reproduction. As these interventions fall short of addressing ongoing and intersecting classed, gendered and ethnic/racialised dispossessions, new mobilisations have emerged in each of the two sites discussed. These include Ch'orti'-Mayan peasants in Guatemala refusing to pay debt and slum dwellers in Mumbai contesting and negotiating displacement. The relational comparative and collaborative feminist analytics deployed in this paper illuminates these multi-sited and interconnected geopolitical processes as well as the limits and possibilities of social movements over dispossession.

We proceed with a theoretical discussion on how feminist engagements – especially with power-laden relations of difference and processes of social reproduction – can elucidate the relationship between geopolitics and dispossession. We argue that feminist geographical perspectives are crucial

for understanding struggles arising from the present conjuncture. As globally circulating logics and practices of security and development articulate to facilitate transnational capital accumulation through ongoing dispossession, we ask when and how do those most affected engage and respond? We then discuss how legacies of Cold War geopolitics of development condition social struggles in Mumbai, India, and Guatemala's Eastern Highlands. The next sections draw on our deep ethnographic engagement in the two sites to tease out the links between social reproduction and intersecting relations of power and difference. Specifically we examine the geopolitics of dispossession through two neoliberal development processes: de(bt)velopment[1] in Guatemala and redevelopment in Mumbai. Key conjunctures of the 1990s and 2000s frame the discussion that ensues as we bring the two studies in conversation with each other. This section elucidates the interconnected processes that produced similarities and differences in the struggles. In conclusion, we suggest how our collaborative praxis in this paper can contribute to a transnational feminist geopolitics of development.

THE GEOECONOMICS OF DISPOSSESSION: BRINGING (FEMINIST) POLITICS BACK IN

The ubiquitous intensification of dispossession through neoliberalisation and war-making over the last decade has ushered in a resurgent focus on the geoeconomic in critical geopolitical debates. Most notable is David Harvey's reworking of Karl Marx's notion of 'so-called primitive accumulation', the historical process of forced appropriation of land and resources that set the stage for exploitative capitalist relations of property and labour in early modern Europe. In line with the work of others who have analysed the continuous character of primitive accumulation,[2] Harvey's 'The New Imperialism' introduces the concept of 'accumulation by dispossession' to connect seemingly unrelated phenomena like land grabs in the Global South to the US war on terror. Harvey emphasises the 'dual nature' of capital accumulation as consisting of surplus wealth extraction through both free-market processes of wage labour and commodity exchange as well as through more direct forms of 'dispossession' – the appropriation of 'other people's property' through 'force, fraud, oppression, looting.'[3] Adapting Rosa Luxemburg's insight that colonialism and international finance advance this latter process, Harvey argues that over-accumulation is the driving force of globalised dispossession.[4] Constantly seeking new arenas of investment and profit, capital backed by state power and military and legal apparatus seize land, water, intellectual property, and social safety nets in the Global North and South. Jim Glassman expands on Harvey's work to include a broader set of 'extra-economic' processes of accumulation and dispossession ranging from state-enforced or militarised land enclosures and privatisation of

natural resources to legally enforced debt repayment and the exploitation of unwaged domestic labour in the realm of social reproduction.[5] In sum, the formation of geoeconomic markets in the past and present has advanced through the usurpation of land, resources, and the fruits of undervalued labour for profit through exchange.

Relatedly, theorisations of 'security' serve to make more visible the links between geoeconomic accumulation by dispossession and contemporary geopolitics. Zeroing in on geopolitics as 'recalibrated by market logics'[6] a number of scholars working within the framework of 'neoliberal geopolitics'[7] critique mainstream pundits like Thomas P. M. Barnett who define security as economic integration enforced through a range of extra-economic means.[8] They call attention to critical geographic scholarship that challenges these neoliberal conceptualisations and their associated tactics of spatial governance. Deploying historically grounded geographic analyses, such work reveals that 'it is not disconnection as much as dispossessing forms of connection'[9] that have caused the greatest instabilities.[10] Others recall that in post-colonial spaces dispossessing connections have long been framed in the language and practices of development through modernisation projects and later through neoliberalisation.[11] For instance, Mark Duffield has argued that states, militaries, and other agents deploy humanitarian development interventions as efficient counter-insurgency tactics; however, this 'security-development nexus' does not aim to end inequality through development but to police and manage it by 'winning hearts and minds' and advancing 'war by other means'.[12] In this way, as Marcus Taylor has shown, securitisation through development displaces insecurity onto the most vulnerable populations.[13]

While we concede that these security debates and the geoeconomic turn in geopolitics more broadly are analytically relevant and timely, we are also concerned that they risk losing a crucial aspect of analysis: political practice. By bringing politics back in we do not suggest a return to state-centric International Relations models nor the solely textual-discursive analysis of early critical geopolitics.[14] Rather, we argue that understanding the politics at the heart of this current conjuncture of global accumulation by dispossession requires grappling with how groups experience, counter, and negotiate these processes. We draw on Massimo de Angelis and the New Enclosures collective who have stressed that struggles to resist or reverse extra-economic processes of capitalist accumulation are themselves constitutive of new processes of dispossession and thus part and parcel of the continuous character of primitive accumulation.[15] While Harvey and other scholars associate accumulation by dispossession with the neoliberal moment, De Angelis, drawing on Karl Polanyi, identifies ongoing accumulation by extra-economic means 'in the social processes or sets of strategies aimed at dismantling those institutions that protect society from the market.'[16] DeAngelis' framework highlights how critical attention to the historical

processes, everyday practices, and spatial interconnections of dispossessions and efforts to counter and/or rework them are crucial for grasping the concrete geopolitics of dispossession.[17] Indeed, social mobilisations around the postcolonial world evidence the fact that people are not simply enrolled as passive victims or pawns of geo-economic securitisation manoeuvres. Neoliberal geopolitics also entails counter mobilisations with varied and unpredictable consequences.[18] In this vein, we conceive of geopolitics as marked by uneven relations of power, knowledge, and force. Subjects constantly negotiate, contest, and rework geopolitical terrains of dispossession based on differentiated lived experiences, power-laden discourses, and material and social constraints and opportunities. Historically and geographically constituted interpretations and aspirations of 'development' – as an improvement in living conditions, for example – are central to how dispossessions are encountered.

Engagement with recent discussions in feminist geopolitics, political geography, and critical development studies[19] can be extremely useful in examining such processes. Together these approaches invite more concrete analyses that consider questions of difference, embodiment, subjectivity, and social practice as fundamental to geopolitical struggles over meaning, resources, and life itself. For instance, Sara Koopman reminds us that marginalised groups are engaging in 'other securities' to resist and protect themselves from unevenly distributed geopolitical violence.[20] Yet as Matthew Sparke has argued, 'Examinations of struggles against dispossession illuminate hopes that are grounded and for the same reason are at once practical and practically limited.'[21] In this sense, our comparative analysis of engagements with and contestations of de(bt)velopment in Eastern Guatemala and redevelopment in Mumbai respectively pushes past the 'romance of resistance',[22] to make visible how particular practices against dispossession emerge and change, as well as the limits they entail.[23]

The question of what is political in geopolitics and political geography has been a major focus of feminist critical engagements with the field.[24] Sara Smith summarises three major feminist critiques of critical geopolitics and political geography more broadly: 1) the privileging of national and global scales of analysis; 2) an add-and-stir approach to gender rather than a deep engagement with 'feminist geographies of difference'; and 3) methodological reliance on textual sources and epistemology.[25] Jennifer Hyndman expands this list, signalling critical geopolitics' failure to challenge the private/public divide and to problematise practices of mobility.[26] To address these critiques Smith calls for 'a nascent feminist geopolitics [that] emphasizes the material and embodied practices that both shore up and pull apart political formations.'[27] However relatively little feminist geopolitics scholarship engages with such practices as they connect with the processes of accumulation by dispossession operating in and through development. Jennifer Fluri's incisive work on the gendered geopolitics of Afghan aid and development

has begun to bridge that gap by linking the social construction, bodily interactions, and gendered performances of aid workers and dispossessed recipients to specific capitalist processes of accumulation and the more-or-less coercive forces they entail.[28] Still the question remains: how do these positionings yield collective mobilisations that attempt to negotiate and counter dispossessions and the differentiated ways in which they are embodied and experienced? In this paper, we attempt a merging of feminist geopolitical theory with feminist and Marxist theories of social reproduction, dispossession, and difference to explore this question.

Theories of social reproduction and difference normally do not register in the domain of geopolitics or accumulation by dispossession. Yet multiple and intersecting relations of power and difference – especially class, gender, and race or ethnicity – fundamentally shape processes of accumulation by dispossession as well as the struggles that emerge in response to them. For instance, Silvia Federici emphasises that primitive accumulation ushered in an accumulation of divisions within the working class, whereby hierarchies of difference became constitutive of class rule. She argues that the labour process, resting on the devalorisation of particular gendered and racialised forms of paid and unpaid work has shaped the modern proletariat.[29] Relatedly, feminist geographers including Katherine Mitchell, Sallie Marston, and Cindi Katz have critiqued the false dichotomisation of productive and reproductive work.[30] Defining social reproduction 'as the fleshy, messy, and indeterminate stuff of everyday life' including everything from cooking and cleaning to education and health care, Cindi Katz develops these insights. She identifies and critiques the extra-economic accumulation of surplus value through under- or unremunerated gendered labour and care.[31] Where Katz juxtaposes understandings of arenas of social reproduction as 'fixed' in place with 'vagabond' capitalist production as freely roaming, we explore the anchored and mobile dimensions of both. In particular, our studies of gendered mobilisations in Guatemala and India show how globally circulating and reworked meanings and practices of social reproduction in relation to development are crucial to geoeconomic processes. We thus build on the work of this feminist scholarship by emphasising how the cultural politics of social reproduction influences the reproduction of the various social structures and processes of capitalist accumulation and dispossession that we outlined above.[32]

In this process, we draw on the Birmingham school of cultural studies of the 1970s and especially Paul Willis, who distinguishes reproduction or the 'biological and generational reproduction of gendered persons in the family' from social reproduction which refers to 'the replacement of that relationship between the classes (i.e., *not* the classes themselves) which is necessary for the continuance of the capitalist mode of production.' Insofar as both of these processes are constituted through diverse and changing meanings, they are also inextricably linked to cultural (re)productions. Though

the categories – cultural (re)production, biological reproduction, and social reproduction – 'share many things' and are central to whether and how capitalism is able to function and reproduce itself, Willis warns that these aspects should neither be collapsed nor arbitrarily disaggregated to deal with specific concerns.[33] We concur with Willis's dialectical notion of social reproduction, which enables the serious consideration of the agency and role of dominated groups in the production, reproduction, and subversion of social structures of accumulation. Accordingly, we engage recent research to clarify how the cultural and biological aspects of social reproduction are linked through highly gendered processes within and beyond the family (an aspect that Willis himself failed to identify). For instance, Rachel Silvey has shown how the cultural value placed on 'dutiful daughters' has bolstered the tolerance of exploitative labour relations by Indonesian domestic workers. Melissa Wright has made a similar argument about the gendered practices and familial tropes of labour control of working 'daughters' bodies by 'paternal' managers in Chinese factories.[34] Sylvia Chant further reveals how recent development paradigms and interventions are increasingly placing the responsibility of alleviating poverty onto third-world women.[35] As various other studies of social change mobilisation within critical development studies (including our own) demonstrate, subaltern groups actively resist or attempt to remake these kinds of social meanings and relations with varying consequences.[36]

Land struggles are central to all of these aspects of social, cultural, and biological reproduction. This is because land and property relations are implicated in both the reproduction of the relations of production and capital accumulation and the biological and cultural aspects of the social reproduction of subaltern groups. Furthermore, because social and biological reproductive labour and associated reproductions of cultural meanings are markedly gendered, struggles over land dispossession often have a highly gendered character. In this paper, we examine the gendered (geo)politics of social reproduction through de(bt)velopment in Guatemala and redevelopment in India, insisting on the differentiated and dialectically interconnected definition of social reproduction that we have laid out above. Specifically we show how de(bt)velopment in the rural Ch'orti' East threatens life and land even as it enrolls the participation of women in mitigating the dispossessing effects of neoliberal developments. Similarly, we examine how redevelopment in Mumbai entails violent evictions and homelessness while promising improved living conditions through participatory resettlement for differently situated women slum residents.

In this way, we are also concerned with the ways that such gendered idioms, experiences, and practices of land and housing struggles have highlighted certain dimensions of dispossession while eliding others. This leads to another important aspect of the social reproduction of capitalist relations: racialised and ethnicised dispossessions. In each of our studies, ongoing

forms of dispossession undergirded by articulations of class and race or ethnicity have led to deepening marginalisations as well as new mobilisations. Uneven dispossession based on racial and ethnic marginalisation are thus central concerns in addressing how social structures are reproduced as Stuart Hall and others have long argued.[37] Through this broadened understanding of social reproduction we are building on feminist scholarship, especially on care work, that untangles the mutually constitutive nature of gender, race, and class.[38] Feminists geographers like Richa Nagar[39] and Jenna Loyd[40] also offer useful insights into our specific concerns by bringing an intersectional analysis into debates on development, geopolitics, and social movements. With an eye to conjunctural crises, Ruth Wilson Gilmore draws on Stuart Hall's 'fatal couplings of power and difference,'[41] revealing how the articulation of differentiated dispossession threatens life itself for racialised and differently gendered groups. We bring these different but related approaches in conversation with Hyndman's call for a redefining of scales, whereby she rethinks the body as both the subject and object of geopolitics.[42] Our work examines both how interconnected processes of development and dispossession map differences not only onto spaces (home and workplace) and places (rural and informal), but also onto bodies (women's, ethnic, indigenous). Differentiated embodied experiences and changing meanings and processes of development and dispossession, in turn, have prompted dynamic and uneven practices of political mobilisations across time and space resulting in new development practices.

In the effort to engage such multiple scales of geopolitics, this paper deploys a conjunctural comparative methodology. Seeking to transcend the pitfalls of both disconnected local particularities and the 'global' reductionist view from 'no where,' we take as a point of departure Cindi Katz's call (extended by Geraldine Pratt and Brenda Yeoh)[43] for transnational (counter) topographies. Such geographic imaginaries draw 'the analytical contour lines between apparently discrete places, while making visible concrete situated practices'.[44] Following Sallie Marston, this starting point breaks down hierarchical false dichotomies between global and local and calls into question the uneven power relations and the (partial) understandings of social reproduction that produce them.[45] Our aim is fundamentally – in line with Gillian Hart's spatially dynamic critical ethnographic approach – to analyse 'how [these struggles] are constituted in relation to one another through power-laden practices in multiple interconnected arenas of everyday life.'[46] Attention to these connections and mutual processes of constitution can signal how particular contradictions and openings are produced in and through the geopolitics of dispossession.[47] By linking the everyday politics of social reproduction and difference to the geopolitics of dispossession through this relational comparative analytic, we hope to generate understandings of the political implications and social change potentialities of seemingly distinct but interconnected social struggles. We begin our analysis with a brief

historical overview of the interrelations and divergences of the geopolitics of development in Guatemala and India.

THE GEOPOLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN GUATEMALA AND INDIA

Countries of the Global South have had a long history of extra-economic exploitation not only under colonialism, but also through post-WWII development agendas, with the Cold War and more recent neoliberal geopolitics significantly conditioning the latter. In this section we argue that Guatemalan and Indian post-war processes of development and dispossession have been and continue to be shaped by these shifting terrains of geopolitics in distinct but interconnected ways. In both countries, high modernist visions and the increasing influence of foreign investment entrenched and transcended polarised Cold War ideologies of capitalism and communism.[48] The entire period of developmentalism was marked by accumulation and dispossession advanced through both extra-economic means and expanded economic reproduction. For instance, national development interventions including large-scale dams and new road systems directly displaced thousands of small farmers in Guatemala and millions in India.[49] At the same time, capital-intensive 'green revolution' agrarian modernisation enriched the rural elite while indebting, squeezing out, and impoverishing large populations of both landed and landless labourers.[50] The particular geopolitical positioning of each country in relation to the US and USSR's conflict for global hegemony, shaped peoples' lived experience of development and dispossession in profound and distinct ways. As an officially 'non-aligned' country, India's leaders took advantage of Cold War competition and drew on support from both the US and the USSR for development and modernisation efforts. Despite nationalist development discourses espousing the Gandhian moral imperative to universally address poverty, eliminate social hierarchies, and sustain village culture, high modernist development and social conflicts in India profoundly affected the rural poor. Development also disproportionately hurt certain groups among the poor including marginalised castes and indigenous groups (*Dalits* and *Adivasis*) and ethno-religious minorities (especially Muslims). In contrast, Guatemala – with its 1954 CIA sponsored coup d'état and subsequent thirty-six-year civil war – became the quintessential Cold War proxy battlefield.[51] Revolutionary militancy grew as US-funded development projects promoted agro-export expansion and megaprojects. In response, the state deployed counter-insurgent tactics from small projects linked to social control of the countryside[52] to racialized scorched earth campaigns that not only displaced over a million people,[53] but entailed state sponsored genocide.[54]

It is on the terrains of these contentious cultural politics of dispossession that neoliberalism began to take hold and reshape development in the 1980s.

A focus on social process and political mobilisation distinguishes our argument in this paper from many other analyses of the neoliberal turn. Literature grounded in crises narratives of state-led development, tends towards a naturalisation of political economy or a disconnected reading of identity-based movements that elides the contradictory political processes of neoliberalisation at multiple scales.[55] Attention to concrete local politics of debt and dispossession in the neoliberal era reveals not so much a demise of the state due to global economic forces nor simply an acknowledgement of the 'cultural consciousness of the people' but a profound reworking of state-society relations. In both countries, the state and dominant classes did not simply submit to neoliberal pressures but carefully ushered in new economic strategies while also balancing the political demands of popular classes.[56] The politics of representation and difference – including the rise of indigenous movements in Guatemala[57] and Hindu Nationalism in India[58] – became important arenas of interconnected cultural and socio-economic struggles and accommodations that profoundly shaped the processes and experiences of neoliberalisation. The Washington Consensus – with its influxes of transnational capital – further established the contours of post-war reconstruction in Guatemala and urban redevelopment in India, reworking the discourses and practices of (in)security, dispossession, and difference.[59]

Thus Cold War politics of development entailed practices of class, gender, and racialised/ethnicised dispossession that shifted wealth and intensified insecurities in uneven ways during the neoliberal era from the 1980s onward. At the same time, social movements and NGOs have countered and negotiated these processes in both countries, ushering in new forms of political engagement and governance. These groups have facilitated the participation of communities in neoliberal development interventions – a process that Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke call 'revisionist neoliberalism'[60] – through uneven or temporary market-friendly solutions to crises of dispossession. Such programmes have tended to enroll the participation of gendered subjects in neoliberal projects by focusing on social reproductive concerns as disconnected from other processes of dispossession. In the next section we lay out how neoliberal development attempted to conceal or mitigate class, ethnic-religious and racial exclusions, through two gendered spaces of participation: micro-lending and slum resettlement programmes. We show how these contradictory intersections of class, gender, and ethnic relations have fuelled both dispossession and new social movements that are simultaneously deepening, reworking, and contesting accumulation in these two seemingly distinct contexts. The studies draw on our own extensive field research (over four years of participant action and observation in Mumbai and the Ch'orti' region of Guatemala), interviews with project staff, textual analysis of project documents and news reports, as well as related research carried out by other scholars. While we do not elaborate on our collaborative relations with actors in those places, they deeply inform our respective analyses and

the comparisons we make. We explore the emergence and shifting strategies of two struggles over dispossession including movements that have sub-verted and challenged debt and foreclosures in the Ch'orti' region of rural Guatemala and negotiated and contested slum evictions in Mumbai, India.

DE(BT)VELOPMENT, DISPOSSESSION, AND DIFFERENCE IN THE CH'ORTI'-MAYA EAST

In Guatemala, new millennium accumulation by dispossession has been shaped by colonial legacies of racialised dispossession, thirty-six years of civil war, and neoliberal 'peace'-making policies tied to conservation[61] and what Casolo calls de(bt)velopment.[62] Rural de(bt)velopment occurs in and through processes of market-led land reform, rural directed credit, and/or micro-finance whereby supposedly ameliorative neoliberal credit programmes for traditionally excluded groups subordinate productive and reproductive activities to finance. When combined with unfettered global markets, this process burdens the very subjects designated for 'improvement'[63] with unpayable debts. In so doing, it threatens social reproduction and facilitates dispos-session. Further de(bt)velopment in rural Guatemala, bound to histories of national security, targeted subjects are often ex–civil defence patrol mem-bers, ex-insurgents or survivors of brutal military 'pacification' campaigns.[64] Significantly however, this conceptualization of debt embedded in devel-opment signals an articulation that is not necessarily given, but requires particular conditions to exist.

In the Ch'orti' East, a multi-lateral-funded smallholders project that used directed agricultural credit as its lynchpin opened the floodgates for a deluge of microfinance institutions. Waving credit as the magic wand for development and incorporating indigenous and women in unprecedented numbers, these institutions collectively saddled rural land-poor families with multiple loans. Then, between 2001 and 2002, two converging crises – the plummeting of international coffee prices and two years of regional drought – triggered famine and foreclosures, making visible the deadly pol-itics of de(bt)velopment in the region. Yet, in attempting to domesticate participation, de(bt)velopment practices linked to neoliberal 'peace' mak-ing also instigated nascent forms of social organisation and travelling rights discourses. Thus even as some new groups assumed the debt, others coa-lesced into an unexpected non-payment movement navigating resistance and negotiation in shifting and contradictory ways. To grasp these dynamics of de(bt)velopment, accommodation, and defiance in the Ch'orti' East, it is nec-essary to unpack the region's unique history of militarisation and racialised dispossession.

The very politics and practices of de(bt)velopment in Guatemala are linked to four centuries of racialised and class-based dispossession and

almost four decades of national security policies that cost the lives of over 200,000 Guatemalans.[65] These processes have earned Guatemala one of the highest land inequality ratings (Gini .084) in the world with 1.9% of the producers owning 57% of the land.[66] By the 1954 coup, colonial legacies, post-colonial laws, and military persecution had slowly forced a drastically reduced, and ever more assimilated Ch'orti' population onto some of the most isolated fragile terrain in the Eastern highlands. Then civil war (1960–1996) dynamics wed development to counterinsurgency bringing agrarian modernisation, racialised military repression, and ongoing extra-economic dispossession to the Guatemalan countryside.[67] This new marriage introduced green revolution technologies and squelched any organised dreams of land reform and local indigenous political control among groups in the Ch'orti' East.[68] Silence, compliance, isolation, and invisibilisation became ways of life that affected women and indigenous peoples the most.[69] Thus in 1988–1989,when local elites availed themselves of neoliberal reforms to privatise huge swaths of "municipal land" in one Ch'orti' municipality – no one said a word.

It was on these grounds of silence that in 1991 the Zacapa and Chiquimula Smallholders Project, PROZACHI was established in order to stimulate participatory agricultural development among *campesinxs* in the region. PROZACHI was a quasi-state entity funded by multi-lateral, bi-lateral and state loans and grants and managed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Nutrition (MAGA) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). With millions of dollars and over one hundred staff, PROZACHI – IFADs' first large-scale project in Guatemala – seemed a promising laboratory for post-conflict neoliberal development, merging peace with free trade in 'pacified' zones.

Through credit, coffee, and the 'building of social capital'[70] PROZACHI (with two phases spanning 1991–2003) lay the groundwork for processes of de(bt)velopment. First, PROZACHI unsheathed agricultural credit as its sword to slay rural poverty and promote soil conservation.[71] Yet, staff quickly realised that they had not understood the complex structure of access and control of land in the region. The project recommendation had identified 80% of landholders in the region as small holders with less than 7 hectares of land. In actuality, historical processes of extra-economic dispossession had left the vast majority of small holders targeted for the programme owning less than one hectare. Further, 'ownership' meant anything from a land title to usufruct rights to *dominio pleno*, with no formal title. PROZACHI was then forced to negotiate with the Guatemalan Agricultural Development Bank to reshape its lending practices and productive strategies by extending loans and coffee production technologies on the grounds of insecure tenure.

Second, as IFAD and PROZACHI adjusted to changing development discourses and local conditions, PROZACHI morphed from a solely productivist project to an architect of 'civil' civil society. Eventually promoters

established four tiers of domesticated producer associations – intra-village, inter-village, municipal, and created related indigenous and women's associations. Together, they culminated in the Regional Ch'orti' Association, ASORECH.[72] Ideally, these associations would carry out international NGO-funded projects, but not question the class and racialised inequalities and exclusions structured by sedimented histories of dispossession and repression that had made those projects 'necessary' in the first place.[73] But the process was slow. Over thirty-six years of perpetual terror restricted how PROZACHI staff effectively could promote participation, credit, coffee, and conservation. After a year of making no inroads, promoters began to utilise and transform spaces and practices of production, social reproduction, and kinship in order to coax men and women into the programme.[74] An invigorated focus on women's participation became crucial to these efforts to 'fix'[75] soils and subjects and make credit quotas.[76]

    PROZACHI staff began to draw on globally circulating Women in Development and gender mainstreaming policy strategies that sought to recruit women in two ways: first by easing biological reproductive tasks and then by incorporating women into economically productive activities.[77] Staff claimed that loans for time-saving, eco-friendly technologies such as mechanical corn grinders and smoke pipes for household stoves,[78] would free women to engage in 'close-to-home' income-generating activities. Credit then could both strengthen women's ability to participate and make decisions in household, village, and inter-village spaces, and establish them as credit-worthy citizens for future loans. Yet, as Stephen Young has powerfully argued, 'Whilst microfinance can enable poor women to challenge gender hierarchies in the family, it may also structure and limit their spatial mobility in other important ways.'[79] For example, loans to support artisan work, purchase kerosene refrigerators, and/or plant vegetables for sale were also designed to 'fix' women to the home, thus reproducing the social relations of production and reproduction while deepening small producer families' imbrication with the market economy. Most significant, however, is how PROZACHI navigated the relationship between women's participation, access to credit, and registration as state citizens.

    Credit linked to state-issued citizen I.D. cards positioned women and ultimately entire families as privy and prey to de(bt)velopment and dispossession. Precisely because PROZACHI extended loans through the state and then a semi-state development bank, state-issued I.D. cards called *cédulas* were required for all potential lenders. Yet, the economics, racism, state violence, and isolation that (re)produced rural patriarchal gender relations in the region effectively had kept I.D. cards for women off the radar.[80] Many rural women, especially indigenous had never even travelled out of their village for fear of sexual abuse. Breaking down these barriers, by 1998, PROZACHI had helped procure identity cards for 3,036 women organised in

intra- or inter-village groups. These cards gained them entry into the electoral as well as the finance system. This process also incorporated women into the PROZACHI promoted 'civil' civil society associations, including two all-women associations.[81] Planners and technical staff celebrated the gender and development aspect of PROZACHI: 'We made women visible . . . today women are seen in all spaces, you see Ch'orti' women everywhere.'[82] Visibility, however, does not necessarily translate into changing power relations or a shift in access to and control of resources.[83] The identity cards touted as 'a smash success in giving non-people, basically illiterate women a chance to life and citizenship'[84] made women vulnerable to a variety of pressures to borrow beyond their capacity to pay.

This double edge of women's visibility and participation became particularly apparent after Hurricane Mitch (1989) when families found themselves embracing the deluge of microcredit – some eighteen new lending entities or portfolios setting up shop in the region – that followed. While the 'increasing mobility and volatility of capital flows . . . enhanced the role of poor households in meeting their everyday needs',[85] it also sunk them deeper in debt and distorted the stated goals of both microfinance and participation. For years PROZACHI I had been over-financing 'beneficiaries': making loans to women and men beyond their capacity to pay. New microcredit opportunities, then, heightened indebted women and men's engagement in what Yogendra Shayka and Katherine Rankin call subversive practices – borrowing that twists the goals of microfinance.[86] Gender-targeted microfinance in particular facilitated families' ability to engage in 'creative borrowing' or 'loan swapping': borrowing from one microfinance institution to pay the interest (at least) on loans at another. Further, women borrowers, in particular, redirected 'productive' credit to meet biological reproductive needs like medicine, education, and food.[87]

The experience of one borrower, Doña Marguerita, who possessed her own small plot of coffee land, illustrates how women precariously managed multiple debts. Doña Marguerita had one loan from PROZACHI that was for income-generating activities tied to a women's development programme. A second loan came from a cooperative to improve her coffee farm. She took out a third loan to pay for the interest on the other two. Marguerita said that her last loan, obtained from a women-focused programme, was 'to pay for medicine because we are all sick from the debt.' Male-headed households practised other loan subversions that deepened gender-laden debt. Many husbands pressured wives to take advantage of global microfinance discourses and practices that favoured women as the ideal, efficient, and responsible credit clients.[88] Male loan promoters also encouraged these practices, pushing women to take out loans to pay their spouses' debts. Gender-friendly lending policies thus obscured the subject formation processes and household and village dynamics that conditioned

who received loans and *for what*. In this way, gender became the modality by which to deepen family debt and open avenues for dispossession.[89]

Gendered lending and borrowing practices fused debt with dispossession when two crises – the crash of international coffee prices and prolonged regional drought – converged locally in the perfect storm.[90] Where a decade of deregulation processes had increased the volatility of the coffee market,[91] a century of agrarian modernisation had depleted soils and watersheds. When drought met drop, food crops, markets, and jobs disappeared. PROZACHI's democratisation of coffee production in the East, quickly became a 'democratisation of debt', cutting across class, ethnic, and gender lines. Although newspaper headlines focused on famine,[92] an equally deadly but less visible result was ongoing dispossession. With the crisis came collection agents and debt threats. Virtually overnight, lending institutions were calling in millions of dollars in capital, interest, fines, and penalties from thousands of small producers and day labourers. In a period of three years, some 1,276 women and men in the Ch'orti' municipalities (the vast majority owning less than 2 acres) reported receiving foreclosure notices, putting 6,786 acres of land at risk. Those borrowers who hadn't used their property as collateral also feared for their land. The lending institutions called on rural police forces to help with collection. Threatened with jail, borrowers would have to sell their agricultural land, home, or usufruct rights. A decade of lending and borrowing dynamics had produced unpayable debt for over ten thousand families – the vast majority land-poor.[93] Trying to not sell or lose their property, those indebted cut back on food and medicine, a trend that supports Julia Elyachar's assertion that microfinance loans often dispossess families of capital required for social reproduction.[94] Moreover, loans made to address rural social exclusion ultimately were furthering what a century of classed, gendered, and racialised processes of municipal formation, counter-revolution, and counter-insurgency had begun: land dispossession.

By criminalising borrowers and threatening life and land, de(bt)velopment resurrected past histories and memories of dispossession, unmasked the limits of 'civil' civil society, and radicalised struggle in the Ch'orti' East. To address the twofold crisis of ongoing dispossession and biological social reproduction, indebted producers turned to local associations created by a decade of 'peace'-making. The PROZACHI-instigated regional association, ASORECH and its affiliates, however, were unprepared and/or unwilling to respond to the material threat of land dispossession. A few women and men that had gained leadership positions and related 'benefits' with ASORECH cast their lot with the politics of accommodation. Yet, for most, the limits of participation as accommodation had become painfully apparent. In desperation, ex-military and ex-guerrilla, women and men, land poor and a few mid-size holders, and indigenous and *mestizo* with nothing in common but debt and dispossession reworked the discourses of human rights that had accompanied neoliberal 'peace'-making.

Declaring the 'right to fight', they slowly united in a regional alliance called the Ch'orti' Campesina Coordination, New Day. By 2004, some six thousand men and women primarily from the four poorest municipalities[95] were occupying plazas and highways, threatening to torch savings and loan cooperatives, and joining national direct actions. Their demand: that their debts be condoned.

Still the contradictions of decades of social control and recent pro-women and paternalistic policies took their toll on the new organisation. Some people sought out New Day 'to see what one could get there'. New Day's anti-debt discourse also reproduced gendered valorisations. Some leaders reified women as vulnerable victims of neoliberal designs to bolster demands of debt forgiveness, while concealing the power-laden gendered household dynamics through which debt worked and the differences of ethnicity and class among women in the organisation. Moreover, the backlash against gender-friendly policies – which many saw as instruments to indebt women – closed many New Day members to any discussion of intersectional hierarchies.

Nevertheless, the very praxis of contestation, rather than accommodation, began reworking articulations of security, dispossession, and difference. New Day's combative stance against debt, its respect for *common sense*,[96] and its growing ability to formulate and negotiate rural policies turned the organisation into a lightning rod for new demands. Many of the most marginalised indigenous communities and destitute women's groups started turning to New Day. Through this process, women and men began to forge their own meaning of security, re-member their indigenous past, and consolidate a defence of an idea and a place: Ch'orti' territory. 'Defense of Ch'orti' territory' has simultaneously placed questions of (re)possession, cultural (re)production, and biological reproduction at the centre of New Day's praxis and resurrected Cold War specters of criminalisation and (in)security. As New Day activists have supported protests, road blockages, and occupations to express indigenous opposition to hydroelectric dams and dry canals, local authorities have labelled them and community leaders 'terrorists' and threatened them with arrest. Further, reminiscent of counter-insurgency practices used to justify genocide, officials have cast entire villages as 'seedbeds of unlawfulness'. Yet, this same war spectre has alarmed speculators, forcing plans for the proposed dry canal to bypass the region. While claiming defence of Ch'orti' territory has not resolved the contradictions rooted in New Day, it has shifted the terrain from domesticating to defying dispossession.

REDEVELOPMENT, DISPOSSESSION, AND DIFFERENCE IN MUMBAI

Accumulation by dispossession in India has increasingly advanced in urban spaces through real estate and infrastructure redevelopment projects. Here

the interests of local developers and transnational finance capital have complemented local elite desires for 'global' or 'world-class' cities. As India's largest and most prosperous city, Mumbai is infamous for exorbitant and volatile land markets (with some areas commanding prices as high as London and New York) making the city a prime target for speculative redevelopment. Meanwhile, over 55% of city residents live in informal or substandard housing known by the catchall term 'slums' which have proliferated as the only affordable housing option. Local state agencies have targeted slums for en masse removal in order to implement redevelopment projects, evicting thousands. Among those displaced, Muslims, North Indians, and other marginalised groups have experienced the most brutal forms of exclusion and dispossession due to a violent historical convergence of municipal party politics, regionalist and Hindu Nationalist ideologies of citizenship and belonging, and neighbourhood struggles over housing and public services. As a result, contemporary anti-poor and ethnicised security discourses blame slum residents for everything from environmental degradation to terrorism.[97] However, redevelopment projects have not advanced in a simple, one-way bulldozing fashion. Mumbai's famously strong slum-based NGOs and social movements have actively countered and reworked the meaning of development, citizenship, and belonging in diverse, contradictory and unpredictable ways. Some NGOs, community groups, and social movements have embraced redevelopment and negotiated resettlement as a means of fulfilling aspirations of improved living conditions. Others have contested evictions on the grounds of exclusions or shortcomings of resettlement. The subjectivities engendered in the process of contesting, negotiating, and enabling redevelopment reveal much about the possibilities and contours of struggles over dispossession. Understanding these politics of redevelopment and dispossession today requires a brief history of slum settlement, politics, and social movements.

Due to variety of pressures linked to development and modernisation initiatives, Indian cities witnessed a wave of migration from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s that continued in subsequent years. With its vibrant and diverse economy, Mumbai was among the top destinations for rural workers displaced by green revolution agrarian modernisation, infrastructure projects, floods, droughts, and caste or ethno-religious violence. Rural migrants settled unused plots, swamps, and street-side spaces throughout the city in informal slum settlements. The tacit though fickle approval of local officials and police seeking electoral support and bribes respectively allowed them to stay in the city and earn their livelihoods informally though under very precarious terms. While most slum residents encountered some level of state harassment, demolition, and extortion, some neighbourhoods faced deeper and more frequent persecution and exploitation. Extremely poor and socially marginalised 'pavements dwellers' residing along the sidewalks of commercial streets were among the most vulnerable to demolitions, lacking

access to the most basic protections afforded to other slums. In the 1980s, pavement evictions became a highly visible site of struggle as a group of left-leaning lawyers and activists filed a court petition against the state on the grounds that demolitions violated poor people's constitutional right to life. In a seminal Supreme Court case, activists argued that residents' lived on the pavements in order to access their livelihoods, and thus demolitions deprived them of their ability to live. Though the court ultimately ruled against the activists, a new movement emerged among some of the poorest Muslim pavement-dwelling women that has since deeply shaped slum politics in the city.

A group of pavement-dwelling women connected with middle-class staff workers of a small welfare services NGO called SPARC took a novel approach to engaging the state. Rather than contesting demolitions, the women began to organise and negotiate for basic social reproductive needs in more non-confrontational ways. Some of their initial actions achieved legendary status in the history of Mumbai's social movements. For instance during one demolition, pavement women accompanied by SPARC staff asked the police to stop the bulldozers, served them tea, and proceeded to dismantle their homes themselves in order to save their belongings from destruction. In another action, Muslim women adopted and reworked the symbolically powerful Hindu ceremony of brotherhood and sisterhood called *Rakhshabandan*. Women enacted the ceremony as 'sisters' offering sweets and blessings to their 'brothers' in the state in exchange for their promise to provide material security. In both ritualised practices, Muslim womanhood was reworked to engage and negotiate redevelopment in a highly feminised and non-confrontational manner that also subsumed contentious ethno-religious and class identities. Another strategy deployed by the women was to collect information about pavement dwellers' needs in relation to housing, education, and sanitation, again highlighting social reproductive needs rather than controversial evictions, ethnic discrimination, and rights to urban space. SPARC staff and the pavement dwellers claimed and demonstrated that women were not interested in fighting with the state, but that they cared only about practical solutions to their housing needs and were willing to participate and cooperate with development processes. Participatory activities including savings mobilisation, alternative housing and sanitation design demonstrations, and community surveying attempted to make visible the existence, capacity, and needs of the poor. These practical solutions were geared towards biological social reproduction, women's participation, and accommodative partnerships with state agents, financiers, and developers.[98]

This non-confrontational strategy of negotiation began to be practised more extensively as the women formed a collective called Mahila Milan and formalised their relationship with the NGO SPARC and a predominantly male slum dwellers' organisation, the National Slum Dwellers' Federation. The three organisations, collectively known as the SPARC Alliance, soon

emerged as one of the most famous NGOs in the world. The SPARC Alliance and other NGOs flourished under conditions of curtailed state public spending and neoliberal orientation towards market and other non-state mechanisms of achieving development goals. Their prominence and success had to do with the combined influence of a strong grassroots base, a positive working relationship with the local state, and increasing international development agency support for public-private partnerships and participatory NGOs. However, as the SPARC Alliance expanded its activities, the subversiveness of gendered collaboration gave way to more disciplining forms of neoliberal subjectivity. The SPARC Alliance and its non-confrontational, pro-development modus operandi took on significant new roles of redevelopment governance as India began to undergo economic reforms.

With economic liberalisation in India in the 1990s, Mumbai's slum policy witnessed major changes that set the stage for both mass evictions and a deepening of market-driven slum redevelopment and resettlement policy in the 2000s. In 1995, the Shiv Sena-BJP coalition – two right-wing Hindu Nationalist and ethno-chauvinist parties involved in propagating some of the worse riots and violence against Muslims and other minorities in Mumbai and other parts of India earlier in the decade – won a pivotal state government election. The new Maharashtra government made a broad set of promises to the diverse Mumbai electorate including the total elimination of slums, world-class urban real estate and infrastructure projects, and the provision of formalised resettlement flats to four million slum dwellers. The government launched a new 'Slum Rehabilitation Scheme' (SRS) which introduced two significant features to slum policy. First, was the offer of resettlement for displaced slum dwellers that met key eligibility criteria. Officials justified exclusions by claiming that the government cannot and should not reward undeserving outsiders – a thinly veiled reference to Muslim and North Indian minorities. Second, resettlement would be financed entirely by the market, offering wildly lucrative incentives to private developers. Having established its role as a civil society representative of slum dwellers in international development circles and as a cooperative partner of the local government, SPARC was the sole NGO invited to the key 1995 meeting that established the specific parameters of the SRS. Meeting with an exclusive group of top state officials and private sector developers, SPARC negotiated a series of additional terms in the policy including resettlement eligibility for previously excluded pavement dwellers and the guarantee that resettlement titles would be in women's names. The group also negotiated the participation of NGOs and community groups in implementation processes to ensure that developers did not abuse the system. Eligible slum residents have since increasingly relied on third parties like the SPARC Alliance to facilitate resettlement. However, the SRS retained a number of serious exclusions in eligibility including residency documentation requirements that have been

applied to curtail compensation to hundreds of thousands of evictees. For a variety of reasons – including discriminatory policy implementation, social barriers to accessing support networks within the state, and changes in the ethno-religious settlement geography of the city since the Hindu-Muslim riots of the 1990s – restrictions have especially hurt ethno-religious minorities. Furthermore, the market-driven design of SRS has meant that resettlement is often done cheaply, crowding large numbers of project-affected people into resettlement colonies on the urban fringes far from original neighbourhoods.

Since these negotiations, the SPARC Alliance has focused most of its efforts on facilitating slum clearance and (mostly off-site) resettlement rather than on-site slum improvements, a shift in position that fits well with powerful local and transnational redevelopment interests. For instance, the Alliance was actively involved in facilitating the participatory, market-based resettlement for a World Bank transport infrastructure project entailing the displacement of over 30,000 households onto the urban fringes of the city. Slum-based women engaged in Alliance mobilisations have participated in a broad range of activities – espousing the benefits of resettlement, training new neighbourhood leaders, and organising around environmental and infrastructural needs in transit camps and resettlement colonies.[99] Women participants often couch their role in terms of women's interests in housing and broader community needs – articulations that have naturalised feminised social reproductive roles and interests. Arjun Appadurai has famously claimed that the SPARC Alliance has produced a 'deep democracy' through its 'politics of patience' in which women occupy a 'moral core' through non-confrontational forms of participation.[100] Others argue that the actual contours of what participation means in the lives of women is complicated and often contradictory in terms of its claims to empowerment and substantive democracy.[101]

What is key to our argument here is that the overall effect of the SPARC Alliance's politics of accommodation and partnership has been to address some concerns and offer some avenues for participation while also enabling the deeper penetration of market forces in slum space. SPARC interventions entail compromises that have yielded substantially to the interests of developers and financiers, resulting in a whole range of new inequalities, insecurities, and pressures. Insofar as these processes have entailed negotiations with right-wing parties, they have (perhaps unintentionally) supported elite agendas and vicious discriminatory practices against ethno-religious minorities and urban migrants. Thus the outcomes of SPARC's mobilisation and negotiation have been very uneven across differently situated groups, revealing intersecting gender, class, and ethno-religious relations of power. However, it is also important to acknowledge that housing and sanitation were not merely distractions from a more authentic class politics. Rather, these mediated negotiations drew on the differentiated experiences of slum residents. Poor women mobilised around partial, feminised, biological social

reproductive needs linked to formalised housing. The reframing of slum women as practical solution-seekers interested in improving their lives and city has provided a means of accessing some housing benefits through a non-confrontational counter-narrative to xenophobic and anti-poor, bourgeois desires to rid the city of its unsightly slums. And despite struggles over cheap construction and infrastructural shortcomings,[102] and arduously long waits for flats and services to materialise, men and women appreciated resettlement. Nonetheless, resettlement was a bittersweet victory for many women and men who expressed being worse off due to distant relocation. While women who could afford the time to stay at home (because of other salaried members of the family) generally cited more benefits, women who relied on jobs in former neighbourhoods experienced increased hardships. Ultimately, participatory neoliberal resettlement rested on an artificially divided womanhood, privileging ostensibly less political, biological social reproductive roles as housewives needing resettlement housing (no matter the location) to the exclusion of those with working lives outside of the home.[103] Ironically, many of these women were domestic workers for upper-class city residences near their former homes. Thus gendered subject formation processes enabled compensation to the eligible and facilitated slum clearances necessary for urban capital accumulation while also deepening inequalities.

In response to eligibility exclusions and off-site resettlement difficulties, some slum residents have recently opposed displacement. For example, slum dwellers affected by a road project supported by the World Bank launched a complaint in a transnational agency for grievance redress of negative livelihood and other impacts prompting a funding suspension and a contentious investigation. Displacement struggles have also taken on a rather different valence for slum residents designated as 'illegal' such as those evicted in a mass demolition sweep during the winter of 2004–2005 leaving over 300,000 homeless. State officials have justified such demolition sweeps through discriminatory discourses claiming that evictees were 'illegal' Bangladeshis and other ethnic and religious groups that were 'invading' Mumbai. Since two infamous terrorist attacks in 2005 and 2010, some politicians reimagining the city as national territory have gone as far as to say that slum evictions are necessary to secure Mumbai from anti-national elements. Meanwhile, many evicted and inadequately compensated residents continue to struggle over housing rights or have attempted to reoccupy cleared lands informally. In these movements, women experiencing intersecting gendered and classed burdens of precarious biological social reproduction as well as ethno-religious identity exclusions have also mobilised against dispossession though not in the same feminised manner as those affiliated with the SPARC Alliance. Instead, they have forged an alliance with a coalition of rural and urban anti-displacement movements called the National Alliance of People's Movements. Spearheaded by the leader of the internationally known Narmada Valley anti-dam movement, Medha Patkar, the National Alliance of

People's Movements (NAPM) has levelled a more vociferous critique of rural and urban displacements connected to neoliberal developments than the SPARC Alliance.

In Mumbai and beyond, the NAPM coalition has challenged the class, ethno-religious, gendered, and caste-based dispossessions of redevelopment by drawing on tropes of national citizenship and social rights. For instance, NAPM has launched a media and action campaign indicting the 'real encroachers of Mumbai', whom they identified as 'the nexus of builders-politicians-bureaucrats' working for the elite. NAPM's targets have been 'corrupt' and unjust state practices of land usurpation in the city and coun-tryside. In Mumbai, movement has organised events – including 'people's hearings' and 'panels' with evictees – where state officials and agencies asso-ciated with market-based slum redevelopment and resettlement have faced accusations of malpractice and injustice. While events have not produced legally binding agreements, the act of turning the table on the state by putting it on trial for anti-poor and 'illegal' practices has served to enact rights claims and publicise ethno-religious and caste-based marginalisation and the hypocrisies of redevelopment. Meanwhile, women and gender con-cerns have played a significant but distinct role in NAPM protests of land usurpations. For instance, NAPM's campaign around women's day 2013 iden-tified forced displacement as a form of state-sanctioned 'violence against women'.[104] Though NAPM maintains a critical stance towards neoliberal development, it has also begun to move away from a solely confrontational stance towards negotiating resettlement for its members. These processes have entailed some level of compromise with development agendas in ways that may threaten to domesticate dissent for strategic purposes. Furthermore, the politics of coalition building has also meant the collapsing of differently situated members' needs in risky ways. Nonetheless, NAPM's defiance of dispossession and negotiation of displacement has directly confronted the violent contradictions of neoliberal redevelopment to challenge and remake the very meanings of city, nation, security, and citizenship.

CONJUNCTURES OF DISPOSSESSION: A RELATIONAL COMPARISON

In this section, we bring the preceding two studies into conversation in order to understand the political formations at the heart of the geopolitics of dis-possession. We lay out the ways in which intersecting relations of difference and the associated biological and cultural dimensions of social reproduction emerge as key arenas of struggles in both the slums of Mumbai and the countryside of Eastern Guatemala. In highlighting the specificities and com-monalities of these two trajectories of struggle, we would like to transcend two common framings that we believe can limit the potential of both analysis and social justice practice. On the one hand, we see these two trajectories

not simply as varied instantiations of generalised geoeconomic processes happening all over the world. Such a rendering would collapse and erase the spatio-political specificities of practice and embodied experiences that give rise to unlikely political formations. At the same time, we want to avoid a disconnected reading of struggle that thwarts the possibility of geopolitical counter solidarity – what Harvey has termed 'militant particularism'[105] – in our understandings of place-based politics of social reproduction and difference. In order to traverse the Scylla of economic reductionist generality and the Charybdis of particularity we offer a conjunctural analysis that foregrounds both specificity and spatial interconnection.[106] We start with what they share – politicisations of social reproduction, intersecting relations of difference, and land struggle – and connect these with other multi-sited processes happening during key historical periods: Cold War national developmentalism and the emergence and deepening of neoliberal development practices during the 1990s and 2000s. We then address the different processes and distinct stakes of ensuing mobilisations for the reproduction, overthrow, or remaking of the insecurities of dispossessing geopolitical formations.

Both Mumbai and the Ch'orti' region of Eastern Guatemala were produced through national developmentalist interventions that were inextricably linked to Cold War geopolitics. In so far as the modernising developmentalist imaginary advanced a homogenised notion of national progress, it worked through the production of multiple intersecting differences and inequalities. Most notably they entailed massive rural dispossession, displacements, and violence born most severely by the poor, especially women and ethnically/racially marginalised groups in differentiated ways that shaped the contours of social mobilisation. In Eastern Guatemala, repeated attempts by indigenous peasants to participate in national popular movements to maintain and/or regain their lands met with violent repression and racialised dispossessions, ultimately burying indigenous practices and silencing dissent. Mumbai saw the proliferation of rural-urban migration and new social movements in slums geared towards housing, tenure security, and basic services. These created the conditions for social movements that were deeply shaped by new geoeconomic and geopolitical processes in the 1990s. With the fall of the Berlin wall and the triumphant declaration among leaders around the world that 'there was no alternative to globalisation,' neoliberal ideologies, social formations, and interventions shaped emerging political configurations. Marked by critiques of state excess and a celebration of market-oriented development, the period hailed a depoliticised civil society as a key actor enabling the political and economic participation of groups that were ostensibly 'excluded' from previous rounds of development. This 'revisionist neoliberalism' saw the unlikely convergence of leftist and right-wing concerns focused on liberal and romanticised understandings of civil society and its emancipatory potential.[107] In Mumbai, NGOs and community groups like the SPARC Alliance gained new opportunities for

engaging in development processes through unevenly distributed and experienced market-oriented resettlement. In Eastern Guatemala, interventions like PROZACHI focused on gendered biological social reproductive needs of small producers and the provision of rural directed-credit as a means of addressing poverty through export production and entrepreneurialism. In this way, feminist geographical perspectives are crucial for understanding how the neoliberal geopolitics of development and dispossession were constantly negotiated, contested, and reworked. These movements to counter the effects of 'neoliberal geopolitical' dispossessions – especially social reproduction struggles – harnessed gendered and ostensibly 'non-political' forms of engagement; through changing credit programmes in one case and market-based, off-site resettlement in the other. In this sense, globally connected but locally specific processes of neoliberal and feminised development helped diffuse conflict and allowed for some mitigation of dispossessing processes. But they also left untouched and even deepened unequal economic and political relations accounting for ongoing dispossessions experienced most severely along racialised or ethno-religious axes of difference as well as less visible forms of gendered marginalisation. Thus a key point of convergence in the two places is that these differentiations formed a basis for the social reproduction of unequal social relations and violent structures of accumulation by dispossession. At the same time, ongoing and deepening dispossessions have led to new articulations of struggle where women and men have mobilised through class and ethnic/racial inflected experiences and idioms of struggle. In both regions, unpredicted social practices, conditions, and crises converged with the shortcomings of the interventions in addressing the full effects of classed, gendered, and ethnic/racialised dispossessions. These convergences, then, lead to shifting political formations of struggle in Mumbai and the Ch'orti' East in the 2000s.

In millennial Mumbai, market-oriented resettlement meant the (negotiated and/or contested) removal of the poor from central urban spaces. Though the social reproductive dimensions of resettlement were meant to benefit women, they elided women's roles as workers who were negatively affected by distant resettlement. Furthermore, market-based resettlement programmes continued to exclude ethno-religious minorities positioned as "undeserving outsiders". With the early 2000s boom in speculative urban redevelopment and rural Special Economic Zone projects, dispossession and displacement intensified throughout India. New coalitions of rural and urban anti-displacement movements invigorated protests against neoliberal redevelopment and eviction in Mumbai. In Eastern Guatemala, regional drought and global coffee crisis intensified the (subverted) use of mushrooming micro-credit opportunities to offset debts. The deepening spiral of debt then multiplied threats of dispossession and unmasked neo-liberal financialisation of social reproduction and domestication of the 1990s civil society organisations. This conjuncture sparked a non-payment movement

that brought indigenous and *mestizo* peasants into the streets. Yet, the movement's initial demands relied on essentialising discourses of women as victims. New formations of land struggle in Mumbai include a rural-urban alliance of displaced people that have harnessed idioms of citizenship to contest neoliberal (re)development and its classed and ethnicised processes of dispossession. In Eastern Guatemala, the multi-arena praxis of struggle combined with new threats of dispossession to place New Day at the forefront of a regional class and ethnic alliance centred on defence of Ch'orti' territory and the rejection of megaproject development as a form of racialised dispossession. Indeed, these shifting articulations of struggle have been intricately bound up with the pressure of capitalist interests: in global city projects of real estate and infrastructure development in Mumbai and large-scale, hydroelectric dams, mining, and other megaprojects in the Ch'orti' East.

With plans for ongoing accumulation by dispossession blocked by increasingly savvy and/or combative alliances, the respective state development apparatuses have harnessed discourses of security criminalising slum dwellers and Ch'orti' debtors and activists. Significant is when and how these tropes are mapped spatially onto public/private binaries that (re)defines taking to the streets (or the courts) as deviant (even 'terrorist') behaviour, with acceptable participation ascribed to homes and NGO offices.[108] These discursive practices have profoundly shaped recent struggles in both places. The criminalisation of debt helped catalyse New Day, while the recent criminalisation and racialisation of New Day's anti-megaproject activities both have created new threats and effectively thwarted one megaproject. In Mumbai, the criminalisation of 'illegal' informal residents and neighbourhoods in public and state discourses and slum demolition practices continues to invoke exclusionary ethnicised rhetorics of urban and national belonging. Criminalisation is simply one resurfacing aspect of how discourses and practices of dispossession, difference, and (in)security intersect.

We also want to stress that it is precisely the ways in which processes of accumulation by dispossession and the struggles against them produce or rework intersections of power and difference and particular configurations of (in)security in one conjuncture that shape limits and possibilities in the next. Current combativeness of land struggles as transnational finance capital seeks new profits is not simply (as Harvey might have it) a *reflex reaction* to accumulation by dispossession; nor is it an absolute rejection of previous gendered claims around biological social reproduction. Rather, our work shows both the force and the unintended consequences of domesticating practices of SPARC in Mumbai and PROZACHI in Eastern Guatemala as deeply tied to both social reproduction (of *both* groups and the unequal relations among them) and international discourses of the 1990s. The revisionist neoliberal moment enabled SPARC and PROZACHI to begin to give voice to real embodied experiences and needs and, to a limited extent, provided a means of political participation and negotiation. However, because

political articulations of gender were tied to very bounded conceptualisations of social reproduction – depoliticised and removed from other intersecting relations of power and difference (including class and ethnicity) – they ultimately reproduced unequal social relations by deepening and shifting dispossession and insecurity across bodies, time, and space.

Yet the key insight of our conversation is not simply that intersecting relations of difference and social reproduction entailed multiple dispossessions or that they catalysed mobilisations that reified certain exclusions, but rather *how* those intersections and exclusions were concretely produced in key moments. Drawing on Stuart Hall's early engagement with the Gramscian use of articulation, we understand these intersections as 'not necessarily given in all cases, as a law or fact of life, but which require particular conditions of existence to appear at all.'[109] Thus, we make visible the multi-scaled interrelated historical and geographical conjunctures and practices by which particular intersections of class, ethno-religion/race, and gender come together and are expressed. In so doing, we clarify the contradictions and openings through which distinct *ongoing* dispossessions and their related mobilisations emerge and change. To what extent, however, these shifts signify the production of liberating articulations of place, power, and difference – those that disrupt rather than reproduce violently exploitative social relations – is as deeply tied to the everyday *praxis* of struggle (dialectical and dialogical) as to any globalising discourse or practice. The most recent claims to Ch'orti' territory and the urban-rural alliance of displacement movements in India emerged at a new conjuncture of intensified capital accumulation. Their articulation depended, however, on *reflection* and *action* that while embodying traces, reproductions, and reworkings of exclusions and insecurities, attempt to transform them. Placing these struggles in conversation with each other and with feminist geopolitical analytics can flag key convergences from which new questions around security, social reproduction, dispossession, and difference can arise. In our conclusion, we discuss these convergences and how they might contribute to a transnational feminist geopolitics.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST GEOPOLITICS

The title of this paper promises a transnational feminist geopolitics and in this conclusion, we would like to lay out what this means and why it is important. First, a transnational feminist geopolitics must engage with the current conjuncture marked by the violent convergence of security, market integration, and dispossession. Insofar as such interventions produce deepening insecurities and the danger of insurgency among marginalised groups, they have gone hand in hand with ostensibly ameliorative and

participatory development in the (post)colonial world. These 'kinder, gentler' development interventions are inextricably linked to the geopolitics of resource conflicts and war. A feminist analytic is crucial precisely because as counter-insurgent neoliberal development operates through the production of differences, it harnesses subjectivities that may domesticate dissent and/or foment confrontation. Attention to histories of postcolonial development and a feminist focus on subjectivity, embodiment, and relations of difference are thus central to both geopolitical analysis and social justice practice.

In order to grapple with the concerns of this political conjuncture, we take inspiration from the transnational feminist methodology offered by Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Mohanty in their now classic book *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*. They situate their intervention in relation to the following aspects of (post)colonial and capitalist forces:

> . . . they own the means of organized violence which most often get deployed in the service of 'national security'; 2) they are . . . militarized – in other words, masculinized; 3) they invent and solidify practices of racialization and sexualization of the population; and 4) they discipline and mobilize the bodies of women – especially Third World women – in order to consolidate patriarchal and colonizing processes.[110]

Alexander and Mohanty reveal that Western pluralist and liberal feminism have deep limitations in coming to grips with these configurations of global power which have striking similarities to our own studies. In response, they offer a 'comparative, relational, and historically based conception of feminism'[111] grounded in analytical interconnection and collaborative practice. This transnational feminist methodology offers a framework that goes beyond the tokenism of simply 'including' women, minorities, and third-world case studies. Rather, it places a de-colonial, anti-capitalist, feminist lens at the centre of theory and practice. It is this transnational feminist methodology that we have endeavoured to advance.

Analytically, what is so compelling about the dynamic movements in Mumbai and Eastern Guatemala is how attention to their interconnected but different engagements with global forces can sharpen our focus on the less visible dimensions of geoeconomic and geopolitical processes. First, revealing how the domesticating practices of the SPARC Alliance's involvement in redevelopment and resettlement and PROZACHI's advancement of de(bt)velopment gave rise to confrontational politics to (re)claim land among the dispossessed and the state's criminalisation of the poor highlights connections. Tied to the body politic and to individual differentiated bodies,[112] accumulation by dispossession processes are entangled with the geopolitics of security from the Cold War to the war on terror. Articulated through hierarchies of power and difference, these processes condition how subjects

struggle to guarantee that their bodies survive, thrive, reproduce, and are safe from harm. Our work concretely challenges ethnicised, racialised, gendered, and place-based discourses and practices that obscure these connections. In so doing we contribute to the breaking down of binaries (urban-rural, public-private, class-ethnicity) that create analytical dead-ends and block political alliances.

Second, our use of critical ethnography and relational comparison draws upon and contributes to the production of a transnational feminist geopolitical analytic informed by situated practices that illuminate the inseparability of peace and war,[113] of domestic and international,[114] of local and global,[115] of social reproduction and production,[116] and of practice and theory.[117] By refusing to treat these two place-based struggles as discrete 'case studies' from which to abstract generalities about the geopolitics of dispossession, we have stressed the potential of dialogical praxis. Following the lead of a number of feminist political geographers and activist-scholars working in both the Global North and South,[118] we show how crises of social reproduction hook up with intersecting classed, racialised, and gendered (in)securities and globalised forces. And we signal how these articulations produce distinct mobilisations with particular paradoxes, constraints, and openings. In so doing, we push beyond conceptions of struggles over social reproduction that collapse women's issues into a predesignated gender and a 'pre-marked body' with a 'predetermined list of issues.'[119] Our field research further reveals the contradictions, crises, and conjunctures through which 'the (to-be) dispossessed' make new connections.

Third, this paper makes evident how collaborative feminist praxis through critical ethnography can contribute to feminist geopolitics. In *Playing with Fire*, the Sangtin writers and Richa Nagar reflect on how transnational interactions among women, activists, and scholars from a variety of social, economic and educational backgrounds provoked new questions:

> Several of us wanted to know how the politics of oil, imperialism, and multinational corporations were connected to one another in the United States' invasion of Iraq. From there many other complex and difficult issues continued to emerge in our conversations . . . . When we connected these topics with the issues that had surfaced in discussions of our diaries, our conversations spread in other directions as well: In the global politics of development and capitalism, when did NGOs arrive on the scene, and how has their form changed over time? . . . And we asked tens of other questions in a similar vein.[120]

In addressing these questions, the Sangtins analysed broader connections in the light of their local practices, and their local practices in the light of these connections. We have brought together our political work, personal experiences, and respective studies to clarify interrelations in a different way than

the Sangtins. One key dimension of our collaborative practice has been our joint experimentations in figuring out how to engage in decolonial forms of relational comparison. Collaboration has also meant that each of us continues to work with activists in two of the movements (NAPM and New Day) that we have addressed in this paper. Elucidating spatial interconnections and specificities allows us to rethink the circulating and shifting class-based, gendered, and ethnicised/racialised discourses and practices of development and security as well as efforts to rework and/or resist them. Our collaborative feminist practice then extends the range of relational comparison and provides a theory-practice towards the *how* of *doing (geo)politics*. We understand that both transnational feminism and critical ethnography are theory-practices that are necessarily partial and constantly changing in practice.[121] Despite these new questionings, we do not see transnational feminist geopolitics as a magic bullet. Transnational feminist geopolitics must be made accountable to the very real and present dangers of recolonisation[122] – through alternative and equally dangerous practices of (mis)representation – as the movements we have addressed suggest. Nonetheless, a transnational feminist perspective offers conceptual and political tools that are imperative for grasping how geopolitical struggles might signal possibilities for liberating praxis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

NOTES

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75. Casolo, *Unthinkable Rebellion* (note 1) develops the dual notion of 'fix' as securing soils and populations and repairing (in conversation with Diane Nelson) 'broken bodies' (individual and politic). See D. M. Nelson, *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1999).

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77. Ibid. WID seeks to involve women in mainstream development processes and putting productive resources in women's hands while gender mainstreaming, which attempts to incorporate power relations in order to address women's subordination. See M. P. Connelly, T. M. Li, M. MacDonald, and J. Parpart, 'Feminism and Development: Theoretical Perspectives', in J. Parpart, M. P. Connelly, and B. V. Eudine (eds.), *Theoretical Perspectives on Gender and Development* (Ottawa: IDRC 2000) pp. 51– 159; C. Moser, *Gender Planning and Development, Theory, Practice and Training* (London: Routledge 1993) for historical lineages of Women in Development, Women and Development, and Gender and Development frameworks.

78. While ostensibly these projects could serve for social production, as well, PROZACHI promoted those particular projects as time-saving activities for social reproduction, see Lundius, *Polishing the Stone* (note 76).

79. S. Young, 'Gender, Mobility, and the Financialisation of Development', *Geopolitics* 15/3 (2010) p. 608.

80. Gender dynamics in the Ch'orti' region reflected divergent articulations of class, ethnicity and geography, with rural indigenous women seemingly the most excluded by Western standards, and mestizo women with some access to income or land having more voice and mobility. These articulations are linked to the historical practice of mestizo or ladino (census takers, soldiers, salespeople) raping and robbing indigenous women. How gender is lived outside of 'Western eyes' is less researched, although violence against women is high in all rural communities regardless of ethnicity.

81. La Asociación de Mujeres Campesinas de Oriente, AMCO y la Asociación de Mujeres de Olopa, AMO. Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Alimentación, MAGA *Proyecto de Desarrollo Rural para Pequeños Productores en Zacapa y Chiquimula (Prozachi), Memoria de Labores 1991-1998* (Guatemala: MAGA 1999).

82. Casolo, *Unthinkable Rebellion* (note 1) p. 108.

83. J. Casolo, 'Gender Levees: Rethinking Women's Land Rights in Northeastern Honduras', *Journal of Agrarian Change* 9/3 (2009) pp. 392–420.

84. Casolo, *Unthinkable Rebellion* (note 1) p. 107.

85. Young (note 79) p. 607.

86. Y. B. Shakya and K. Rankin, 'The Politics of Subversion in Development Practice: Microfinance in Nepal and Vietnam', *Journal of Development Studies* 44/8 (2008) pp. 1214–1235.

87. Ibid. Shakya and Rankin posit four overlapping types of practices by borrowers that subvert the goals of micro-lenders: loan swapping or creative borrowing; illicit investment-using productive credit for non productive activities; risk management; and evasion, irony and critique.

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89. Gloss on Hall, 'Race, Articulation' (note 37).

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91. J. Nevins, 'Dying for a Cup of Coffee? Migrant Deaths in the U.S. Border Region in a Neoliberal Age', *Geopolitics* 12/2 (2007) pp. 228–247.

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95. Casolo, *Unthinkable Rebellion* (note 1). PROZACHI I eventually operated in seven munic-ipalities in Chiquimula Province and one in Zacapa. New Day founders came primarily from four municipalities: Olopa, Jocotán, and Camotán which were largely indigenous and La Unión, Zacapa, all municipalities that register high percentages of extreme poverty.

96. Casolo (ibid.) highlights New Day's Gramscian ability to start from where people were at (*senso comune*) and through action and reflection turn that into their own critical consciousness (*senso buono*).

97. R. Chatterji and D. Mehta, *Living with Violence: An Anthropology of Events and Everday Life* (New Delhi: Routledge 2007); T. B. Hansen, *Wages of Violence : Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2001).

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99. S. Doshi, 'The Politics of the Evicted: Redevelopment, Subjectivity and Difference in Mumbai's Slum Frontier', *Antipode* 45/3 (2013); Doshi (note 98).

100. Appadurai (note 98).

101. Doshi, 'Politics of the Evicted' (note 99); Doshi, 'Politics of Persuasion' (note 98).

102. R. Modi, 'Resettlement and Rehabilitation in Urban Centres', *Economic and Political Weekly* 44 (2009) pp. 20–23.

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107. Mohan and Stokke (note 60).

108. See also M. W. Wright, 'Paradoxes, Protests, and the Mujeres de Negro of Northern Mexico', *Gender Place and Culture* 12/3 (2005) pp. 277–292; M. W. Wright, 'Necropolitics, Narcopolitics, and Femicide: Gendered Violence on the Mexico-U.S. Border', *Signs: Journal of Women, Culture and Society* 36/31 (2011) pp. 707–731.

109. The full quote reads, "By the term, 'articulation', I mean a connection or link which is not necessarily given in all cases, as a law or fact of life, but which requires particular conditions of existence to appear at all, which has to be positively sustained by specific processes, which is not 'eternal' but has constantly to be renewed, which can under some circumstances disappear or be overthrown, leading to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections – re-articulations – being forged." S. Hall, 'Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates', *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 2/2 (1985) 91–114.

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111. Ibid., p. xvi.

112. Nelson (note 75).

113. Hyndman, 'Mind the Gap' (note 42); Loyd (note 40).

114. Katz, 'On the Grounds' (note 44); L. Briggs, G. McCormick, and J. T. Way , 'Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis', *American Quarterly* 60/3 (2008) pp. 625–648; Loyd (note 40).

115. Massey (note 106); G. Hart, *Disabling Globalization: Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press 2002).

116. Katz, 'Vagabond Capitalism' (note 31); Wright, 'Paradoxes' (note 108); R. W Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* (Berkeley: University of California Press 2007).

117. Pratt and Yeoh (note 43 2003); Sangtin Writers Collective and R. Nagar, *Playing with Fire: Feminist Thought and Activism through Seven Lives in India* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2006); Hart, *Disabling Globalization* (note 115); Gilmore, *Golden Gulag* (note 116).

118. Gilmore, *Golden Gulag* (note 116); Loyd (note 40); Sangtin Writers and Nagar (note 117).

119. Nagar (note 39) p. 140.

120. Sangtin Writers and Nagar (note 117) p. 127.

121. Hart (note 17) p. 996. See also Lave (note 46).

122. See A. L. Swarr and R. Nagar (eds.), *Critical Transnational Feminist Practice* (Albany: SUNY Press 2010) and G. C. Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak', in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1988) pp. 271–313.